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The Physical Evidence Dilemma:
Does ABA Standard 4-4.6 Offer
Appropriate Guidance?
RODNEY

J.

UPHOFF*

Since 1966, when criminal defense lawyer Richard Ryder was disciplinedfor retaining
physical evidence that connected his client to a bank robbery, lawyers and courts have
struggled with the ethical dilemma of how defense lawyers should deal with physical
evidence that potentially incriminates one of their clients. When a lawyer takes
possession of an evidentiary item, must she always turn it over to the authorities, as
required by most courts that have addressed this dilemma? Or, can defense counsel
return the evidence to the source from whom counsel received it as recommended by
Standard 4-4.6 of the ABA CriminalJustice Standardsfor Prosecution and Defense
Functions?
This Article explores three scenarios that present variations of the physical evidence
conundrum and explores the extent to which existing authority provides clear guidance
when lawyers find themselves wrestling with a physical evidence quandary. The Article
concludes that Standard4-4.6's more nuanced return-to-the-sourcerule strikes a better
balance between defense counsel's duty as an officer of the court and her duties as a
zealous advocate than the mandatory turnover rule championed by most courts and by
section 119 of Restatement (Third) of the Laws Governing Lawyers. Finally, the
Article urges those revising Standard4-4.6 to retain its basic approach, but to address
some of the weaknesses of the Standard.

* Elwood L. Thomas Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, University of Missouri. I would like
to thank Peter Joy, Ellen Yaroshefsky, Bruce Green, and the participants of the ABA-sponsored
roundtables at Vanderbilt University Law School, Cardozo Law School, and Washington & Lee
University Law School for their constructive comments. I would also like to thank Andrew Blackwell,
Tressa Kelly, Justine Guyer, Cheryl Poelling, and Cindy Shearrer for their assistance in the
preparation of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
In August 1966, Richard Ryder, an experienced criminal defense
lawyer in Richmond, Virginia learned that one of his clients, Charles

Cook, was a suspect in a bank robbery.' After talking with Cook, who
denied any involvement in a robbery, Ryder spoke with the FBI, who
told him that some of the stolen money included bait money.' Ryder
spoke again with Cook who admitted to him that he had placed some
money in a safety deposit box.3 Worried that Cook might try to dispose
of the money, but also concerned that the FBI would soon discover the

i. In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 361-62 (E.D. Va. 1967), affd per curiam, 381 F.2d 715 (4th Cir.
1967)-

Id. at 362.
3. Id. Ryder testified that Cook concocted a story regarding the money that he did not believe.
The court subsequently held that Ryder "knew" the money in the safety deposit box was stolen. Id. at
362,364.
2.
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stolen money in Cook's safety deposit box, thereby establishing Cook's
guilt, Ryder consulted with a well-regarded lawyer about his
predicament.' Ryder discussed his plan to transfer the money from
Cook's safety deposit box to his own, believing that by doing so he could
prevent Cook from disposing of the stolen money.' Both of the lawyers
thought that eventually the FBI would discover the money in Ryder's
safety deposit box.6 They also thought that, at that point, Ryder could
assert the attorney-client privilege and thereby thwart the government's
ability to link the money to Cook.! The other lawyer never suggested to
Ryder that by transferring the money, he was acting illegally or
unethically.' He did advise Ryder, however, not to act surreptitiously and
to let Cook know that the money was going back to the rightful owners.'
Ryder proceeded to draft a power of attorney, which Cook signed,
giving him the right to enter Cook's safety deposit box and remove the
contents to be disposed of as Ryder saw fit.'o Although Ryder did not
specifically tell his client that the money was going back to the rightful
owners, Ryder claimed that he intended to return the money to the
owners when he could do so without harming Cook." Ryder took the
power of attorney to the bank, rented his own safety deposit box, and
then used the power of attorney to gain access to Cook's safety deposit
box." In Cook's box, he found the stolen money and a sawed-off
shotgun. 3 Ryder transferred both the money and the sawed-off shotgun
to his own safety deposit box. 4
Unsure of the propriety of what he had just done, Ryder went
almost immediately to talk to a distinguished law professor, who also was
a retired judge, and told him about the transfer.s Ryder told the retired
judge that he intended to return the money to the rightful owners once
the case was disposed of and wanted "responsible people in the
community" to know." The retired judge did not give Ryder the
impression that Ryder had acted unlawfully or unethically." That same
day, Ryder also spoke to a state court judge and a state prosecutor,
4. Id. at 362. The lawyer Ryder consulted was a former officer of the Richmond Bar Association.
Id.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
io.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 363.
Id.

ii. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.

16. Id.
17. Id. at 364.
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telling both of them about his actions." They advised him that he could
neither receive such property nor retain possession of it."
Cook was subsequently charged with bank robbery, and Ryder
appeared with him in court.o Unfortunately for Mr. Ryder, the FBI
obtained a search warrant for his and Cook's safety deposit boxes." The
money and the weapon were seized, and Ryder was charged with
professional misconduct for knowingly taking possession of and secreting
the instrumentalities and fruits of a crime." Flatly rejecting his defense
that his ethical duties and the attorney-client privilege legitimized his
actions, the court held that no statute or ethical canon authorized Ryder
to knowingly conceal the items in this manner." Ryder's duty to be a
zealous advocate for his client did not permit him to aid Cook by taking
possession of the items to purposefully hinder the government's
prosecution of his client.24 The court accepted Ryder's claim that he
eventually intended to return the money to the rightful owners, but said,
"no attorney should ever place himself in such a position."" Accordingly,
the court found Ryder guilty of receiving stolen property and possession
of illegal weapons, and suspended him from practice in federal court for
eighteen months.
The dilemma that Richard Ryder mishandled in 1966 continues to
bedevil criminal practitioners in 2011. Unlike Ryder, however, today's
criminal defense lawyers have the benefit of Standard 4-4.6" of the ABA
Criminal Justice Standards for Defense Function and a host of articles
that have been written in the past forty years offering guidance on how
defense lawyers should deal with physical evidence that potentially
incriminates one of their clients." Additionally, numerous courts" and

i8. Id.
19. Id.

2o. Id.
2l. Id.
22. Id. (citing

VIRGINIA STATE BAR CANONS OF PROF'L ETuIcs CANONS 15, 32).

23. Id. at 369.
24.

Id. at 365.

25. Id.

26. Id. at 370. Ryder's suspension was upheld on appeal. In re Ryder, 381 F.2d 713, 714 (4th Cir.
1967) ("Ryder made himself an active participant in a criminal act, ostensibly wearing the mantle of
the loyal advocate, but in reality serving as accessory after the fact.").
27. The third edition of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for Defense Function was adopted
by the ABA House of Delegates on February I1, 1991. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, at iii (3d ed. 1993). The complete text of the current version of
Standard 4-4.6 entitled "Physical Evidence" is set forth infra Appendix A.
28. See, e.g., Michael B. Dashjian, People v. Meredith. The Attorney-Client Privilege and the
Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Rights, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 1048 (1982); Stephanie J. Frye,
Disclosure of IncriminatingPhysicalEvidence Received from a Client: The Defense Lawyer's Dilemma,
52 U. COLo. L. REv. 419 (s981); Jane M. Graffeo, Ethics, Law, and Loyalty: The Attorney's Duty to
Turn over Incriminating Physical Evidence, 32 STAN. L. REv. 977 (s98o); David Layton, Incriminating
Physical Evidence, Ethical Codes and Source Return, PROF. LAW., 2002 Symposium, at 59; Norman
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bar ethics committees"o over the years have addressed variations of the
physical evidence conundrum. Finally, many professional responsibility
treatises and texts now include a discussion of In re Ryder, or at least
discuss the topic of counsel's ethical responsibilities with respect to
incriminating physical evidence.3" Thus, today's practitioner ought to be
better prepared and better positioned to respond effectively to the
ethical quandary that tripped up Richard Ryder.
Nevertheless, while today's criminal defense lawyer may be in a
somewhat better position than Ryder to avoid the suspension he
suffered, variations on the physical evidence dilemma often arise in
circumstances that do not allow for careful reflection and meaningful
consultation. The criminal practitioner facing this dilemma for the first
time will find that neither the Model Rules of Professional Conduct nor
any state variations offer any clear guidance with respect to this ethical
quandary." Although some state courts have rendered decisions that
should influence how the lawyers in that jurisdiction respond to a
variation on the physical evidence dilemma, many state courts have not
addressed the issue. Given the complexity of this ethical conundrum, it is
not surprising that conscientious criminal defense lawyers continue to

Lefstein, Incriminating Physical Evidence, the Defense Attorney's Dilemma, and the Need for Rules,
64 N.C. L. REV. 897 (1986); John Randall Trahan, A First Step Toward Resolution of the Physical
Evidence Dilemma: State v. Green, 48 LA. L. REV. IOI9 (1988); Mark Hansen, Hand It over, 91 ABA
J., Dec. 2005, at 3o; Evan A. Jenness, Ethics and Advocacy Dilemmas- Possessing Evidence of a
Client's Crime, CHAMPION, Dec. 20oo, at 16; Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Incriminating
Evidence- Too Hot to Handle, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2009, at 42.

29. Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985); In re January 1976 Grand Jury (Genson),
534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976); Gipson v. State, 6o9 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1980); Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d
12oo (Alaska 1978); Magill v. Superior Court, lo3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355 (Ct. App. 2001) (ordered
unpublished), as modified on denial of reh'g, (Jan. 29, 2oo); People v. Superior Court (Fairbank),
237 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Ct. App. 1987); In re Navarro, 155 Cal. Rptr. 522 (Ct. App. 1979); People v. Lee,
83 Cal. Rptr- 715 (Ct. App. 1970); Anderson v. State, 297 SO. 2d 871 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); State v.
Carlin, 640 P.2d 324 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Green, 493 So. 2d 1178 (La. 1986); Commonwealth
v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681 (Wash.

1964); cf Quinones v. State, 766 So. 2d 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Dillon, 47I P.2d 553,
565 (Idaho 1970); Rubin v. State, 602 A.2d 677 (Md. 1992); People v. Nash, 313 N.W.2d 307, 314
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd in relevant part, 341 N.W. 2d 439 (Mich. 1983); In re Original Grand Jury

Investigation (Helmick), No. L-98-i146, 1999 WL 518837, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. July 23, 1999), affd,
733 N.E.2d 1135 (Ohio 2000).
30. Colorado Ethics Handbook, Formal Op. 6o (July 24, 1982); Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Advisory
Ops. on Prof'1 Conduct, Op. 88-13 (May so, 1989); Oregon State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 1991-o5
(July 1991); North Carolina State Bar, RPC 221 (Oct. 20, 1995); West Virginia State Bar, LEI 98-02

(Sept. 4, 1998).
31. See, e.g., JOHN M. BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETmcs: LAW AND LIABILITY § 5:22 (20o ed.
2010); JOHN WESLEY HALL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN CRIMINAL DEFENSE PRACTICE § 34:2 (3d ed.
2005); I GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 9.29, at 9-120 to 9-122

(3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2004-2); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING
26-42 (5th ed. 2010).

32. See infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
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struggle to ascertain how to deal properly with potentially incriminating
physical evidence.
On the other hand, for a few criminal defense lawyers, such complex
ethical issues seemingly do not present any difficulties. Some defense
lawyers are so closely aligned with their clients that they will do anything
to further their client's interests.33 Such unbridled partisanship on behalf
of one's clients leads some lawyers to engage in clearly illegal or
unethical conduct. For these lawyers, neither Standard 4-4.6 nor ethical
ambiguity is likely to matter.
In Richard Ryder's case, however, his consultations with others
about his ethical responsibilities demonstrated a desire to act ethically. It
is highly unlikely that he would have alerted others to his actions and
sought advice if ethical concerns were irrelevant to him. If his primary
motivation had been to conceal or destroy the evidence Ryder would not
have openly transferred the money and shotgun to a safety deposit box at
the same bank as Cook's own safety deposit box because he knew that
the FBI had Cook under surveillance,.34 Rather, Ryder appears to have
been a conscientious lawyer faced with a tricky predicament he had not
previously encountered, whose interest in zealously defending his client
clouded his judgment.
Part I of this Article begins by presenting three scenarios that depict
common variations on the physical evidence dilemma Ryder confronted.
Part II briefly reviews the conflicting guidance lawyers must wade
through before deciding how to respond to such a dilemma. As Part II
discusses, a defense lawyer's options are significantly limited in some
jurisdictions, because courts in those jurisdictions unequivocally require
defense counsel who take possession of any physical evidence to turn it
over, sua sponte, to the appropriate authorities.35 In many jurisdictions,
however, a criminal defense lawyer possessing such an item will have to
decide whether she is obligated to deliver that evidence to law
enforcement authorities as demanded by most courts," bar ethics
committees," and section i19 of Restatement (Third) of the Law
33. See, e.g., In re Millett, 241 P-3 d 35 (Kan. 200) (sanctioning defense counsel who conspired
with client to trick the client's brother into telling a false story to aid the client's defense, and then
tampering with a recording device in an attempt to cover up his misconduct); State ex rel. Okla. Bar
Ass'n v. Harlton, 669 P.2d 774 (Okla. 1983) (suspending counsel for five years for willfully concealing
a gun used by another to commit a crime for the express purpose of hindering the arrest and
prosecution of this person).
34. Indeed, Ryder testified that he intended to return the money to the bank as soon as he could
safely do so. In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 363 (E.D. Va. 1967), affd per curiam, 381 F.2d 715 (4th Cir.
1967).
35. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Fairbank), 237 Cal. Rptr. 158, 163 (Ct. App. 1987).
36. See authorities cited supra note 29.
37. See, e.g., California State Bar, Comm. on Prof'I Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. No.
1984-76 (1984); Nevada State Bar, Comm. on Ethics & Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. No. io (June
3, 1988); Colorado Bar Ethics Comm. Op. 60 (1982); Maryland State Bar Ethics Op. 90-24 (1990);
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Governing Lawyers,'8 or whether she can take other action as
recommended by Standard 4-4.6,39 other courts,'
and some
commentators.' In light of this conflicting guidance, then, how ought a
criminal defense lawyer respond when faced with a variation on the
quandary that confounded Richard Ryder? Does Standard 4-4.6 properly
balance defense counsel's role as her client's champion with her duties as
an officer of the court? Does the return-to-the-source option articulated
in Standard 4-4.6 allow counsel the flexibility needed to assist her client
effectively without becoming an agent for the prosecution, or does it
serve to undermine the fair administration of justice?
Part III explores these questions by first analyzing how the lawyers
should have responded in the three scenarios outlined in Part I and then
by examining the defense lawyer's conduct in one of the most recent
physical evidence cases, In re Olson.42 Like the Montana Commission on
Practice ("Montana Commission") and the Montana Supreme Court, I
believe that Olson handled the ethical dilemma he faced in a
professionally appropriate manner and that he did not unlawfully
obstruct justice or conceal evidence. I also agree that Standard 4-4.6
offers appropriate guidance for a lawyer confronting such a dilemma.
As Part IV concludes, however, neither the current version of
Standard 4-4.6 nor its proposed replacement, Standard 4-4.8, entitled
"Handling Incriminating Physical Evidence," 43 provides a complete set of
answers to all of the questions that may arise when defense counsel must
decide what to do with an item of potentially incriminating physical
evidence. In fact, the revised version of Standard 4-4.6 still leaves some
important questions unanswered. Moreover, given the variations in state
law regarding obstructing or hindering justice and tampering or
concealing evidence, no matter how this Standard is crafted it cannot
provide criminal defense lawyers a safe harbor, immunizing them from
criminal prosecution or disciplinary action." Nevertheless, Standard 4-4.6

Pennsylvania Ethics Op. 95-1 (1995).
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § II9 (2000).
39. STANDARDS FORCRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCrION § 4-4.6 (3d ed. 1993).

4o. See, e.g., Hitch v. Pima Cnty. Superior Court, 708 P.2d 72, 78 (Ariz. 1985) (stating that if
counsel reasonably believes that evidence will not be destroyed, he may return it to the source);
Commonwealth v. Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114, 123 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (stating that counsel may return
physical evidence to the source under certain circumstances).
41. See, e.g., AM. TRIAL LAWYER'S Ass'N COMM'N ON PROF'L RESPONSIBILrrY, THE AMERICAN
LAWYERS' CODE OF CONDUcr R. 3.7 cmt. & illus. 3(c), at 304-05 (Discussion Draft 1980); Lefstein,
supra note 28, at 929.
42. 222 P-3d 632 (Mont. 2009).
43. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JuSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCrION § 4-4.8 (Proposed Revisions 2009); see
text of the proposed Standard infra Appendix B.
44. For an excellent article that discusses the interplay between criminal law and professional
norms, concluding that both courts and prosecutors should be more accommodating of criminal

defense lawyers acting in concert with professional norms, see Bruce A. Green, The Criminal
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strikes a more appropriate balance than does section 119 of the
Restatement or many of the courts that have confronted this troublesome
quandary.

I. THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE DILEMMA: THREE COMMON SCENARIOS

A.

THE MURDER WEAPON
Sally Smith, a public defender, has been assigned to represent Bob
Brown who was recently arrested for the murder of his wife. She goes to
interview Brown in the county jail. Reluctant to talk, Brown is persuaded
by Smith that she will maintain his confidences and zealously defend him,
whatever he may or may not have done. Reassured, Brown then tells
Smith that he stabbed his wife and hid the knife in a trash dumpster near
his home. Brown also informs Smith that he knows the dumpster will be
emptied later that day, so he is confident that the weapon will not be
discovered. Should Smith or her investigator go to the dumpster and take
possession of the knife? If Smith takes possession, is she obligated to
turn over the weapon to the authorities? If she opts not to go, is she still
permitted or required to inform the authorities to ensure that the
weapon is not destroyed?

B. THE

SHOES

Attorney Tom Black's secretary informs him that a young woman
whom he represents in another matter has just arrived at his law office
wishing to discuss a possible criminal matter. The woman is escorted into
Black's office holding a brown paper bag. After asking what he could do
to assist her, Black learns that the police had just come to the woman's
apartment looking for her. The police told her roommate that they
wanted to talk to her about a possible shoplifting at a local department
store. The woman tearfully admits that she had shoplifted some shoes,
and that they were in the bag she was carrying. Assuming that Black
takes the case, should he take possession of the shoes or let the woman
leave with the shoes? If Black does take possession, may he return the
shoes to the store or is he required to turn them over to the police? If
Black returns them to the store may he do it anonymously?
C.

THE DAMAGED CAR WITH THE BLOODY SMEAR

Art Wall comes to see attorney Sue Jones for legal advice. Wall tells
Jones that he went to a party the night before and got very intoxicated.
He recalls starting to drive home but has no memory of anything else
until waking up in his bed with a massive hangover. As he was lying in

Regulation of Lawyers, 67

FORDHAM

L. REv. 327 (1998).
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bed, he heard on the radio that the police were looking for a white car
involved in a hit-and-run accident with a pedestrian on Western
Boulevard. The victim, a little girl, was in critical condition. Wall said he
drove a white Honda but did not think anything more of the story until
he went to his garage and noticed damage to the right front side of his
car. He was positive that this damage had not been there before the
party. He also noticed what appeared to be a bloody smear. Wall said he
panicked at that point because, given the location of the party, he may
well have been on Western and involved in the accident. When asked
where the car was right now, Wall replied that it was still in his garage.
He had taken the bus to Jones's office.
Assuming again that Jones takes Wall's case, should she and/or her
investigator go to Wall's garage and look at the damage? Should she take
photos of the damage? Should she examine or test the blood-like
substance? What, if anything, will Jones be required to disclose to the
authorities? What, if anything, can Jones say to Wall about the car?

II.

CONFLICTING ETHICAL NORMS AND CASE LAW

A lawyer contemplating taking possession of physical evidence will
find that ethical rules and case law offer conflicting guidance as to how
she ought to deal with this dilemma. Counsel also must recognize that
state law in her jurisdiction may limit her ability to take or retain
possession of the item without turning it over to law enforcement
authorities. Standard 4-4.6, however, recommends that generally defense
counsel return the item to its source rather than turn it over to the
authorities. This Part concludes by revisiting Ryder's dilemma and
considering how in light of Standard 4-4.6 he should have dealt with his
conundrum.
A. ETHICAL RULES
Like all lawyers, the criminal defense lawyer owes her clients the
duties of competence, confidentiality, and loyalty.45 No one questions
that defense counsel must serve the best interests of her client despite the
unpopularity of her client or the heinous nature of the alleged crime.
Zealous representation by a loyal advocate is critical to an adversarial
system that presumes the defendant innocent and places the burden of
proof squarely on the prosecution.46

45. As Standard 4-1.2(b) concisely states, "The basic duty defense counsel owes to the
administration of justice and as an officer of the court is to serve as the accused's counselor and
advocate with courage and devotion and to render effective, quality representation." STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-I.2(b) (3d ed. 1993).
46. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 250 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part).
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Defense counsel's zealous advocacy is not, however, unbounded. As
the preamble to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct stresses, a
lawyer must act "within the bounds of the law" in carrying out her duty
to "zealously" protect and pursue a client's "legitimate interests." 47
Obviously a lawyer cannot assist her client by acting outside the law or
by pursuing illegitimate interests. The bounds of law, however, are not
always easily determined4 As the preamble acknowledges, a lawyer's
conflicting responsibilities to her client and to the legal system raise
difficult issues requiring "the exercise of sensitive professional and moral
judgment." 49 Indeed, in some instances, a lawyer "has duties to the
tribunal, to the public, and even to adversaries that can create tension
with and even trump the same advocate's duties to advance his client's
cause."50
Unfortunately, the Model Rules offer little constructive guidance
for resolving the dilemmas presented above. Model Rule 8.4 commands
that a lawyer not commit a criminal act, engage in dishonest or deceitful
conduct, or engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice."' This provision standing alone cannot reasonably be read to forbid
a lawyer from taking temporary possession of an item of physical evidence
absent some intent on the part of the lawyer to alter, destroy, or conceal
the item from the authorities. Model Rule 3-4(a) states only that a lawyer
shall not "unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having
potential evidentiary value."5 ' Additionally, Rule 3.4(a) prohibits a
lawyer from counseling or assisting another person to do any of the acts
she is forbidden to do.53 The Rule's use of the word "unlawfully" is
significant, clearly indicating that not all conduct that obstructs, alters,
destroys or conceals evidence violates Rule 3-4*54 The comment to Rule
3.4 observes,
Applicable law may permit a lawyer to take temporary possession of
physical evidence of client crimes for the purpose of conducting a
limited examination that will not alter or destroy material
characteristics of the evidence. In such a case, applicable law may
require the lawyer to turn the evidence over to the police or other
prosecuting authority, depending on the circumstances.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr pmbl. 1
48. See Green, supra note 44, at 353-7 149. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT pmbl. 1

47.

9 (2oro).
9 (2oo).

50. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & WILLiAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 30.2, at 30-3 (3d ed.

2001 & Supp. 2011).

51. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(2010).
52. Id. R. 3.4(a).
53. Id.
54. See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT 325 (6th ed. 2007).
ss. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 2 (20IO). This language was added in
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Although such advice alerts criminal practitioners of the need to examine
state law on the subject, it offers little guidance to lawyers who ultimately
must decide how to respond ethically to a particular physical evidence
dilemma.
Nor was the Model Code any better. Model Code Disciplinary Rule
that he
7-lo9(A) stated that "[a] lawyer shall not suppress any evidence
or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce.", 6 It is difficult to
conclude that this duty not to suppress evidence necessarily includes an
affirmative obligation to retain incriminating evidence and then produce
it without any request or order. Nor is it clear under what circumstances
failing to produce evidence sua sponte constitutes suppressing evidence.
It is not surprising, therefore, that a lawyer in Ryder's situation might
read Disciplinary Rule 7-lo9(A) and fail to find the answer as to whether
he could or could not take possession of the stolen money.
B.

STATE STATUTES

Neither the Model Rules nor the Model Code suggests that a lawyer
may disregard state law when she takes or retains possession of any
physical evidence. Thus, to understand her legal obligations with respect
to the possession of physical evidence, counsel must determine whether
her possession of the evidence will run afoul of her jurisdiction's laws
dealing with obstruction of justice, tampering with evidence, or any other
offense related to the alteration, concealment, or destruction of evidence.
That determination is not necessarily straightforward. Rather, "[t]he
criminal law relating to obstruction of justice is complicated, ambiguous,
and subject to considerable jurisdictional variation."" In some
jurisdictions, lawyers are specifically excluded from the reach of certain
criminal statutes.' Generally, however, state statutes do not provide an
exemption for a lawyer whose handling of physical evidence may
constitute altering, concealing, or destroying evidence." Some courts
have construed their statutes dealing with obstruction of justice or
tampering with evidence to block defense lawyers from criminal
convictions or disciplinary action if counsel was acting in a good faith
belief that her conduct was professionally required.6 That may be little
56. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILTY DR 7-lo9(A) (1983); see also ABA CANONS OF PROF'L

Enics Canon 5 (1969).
57. Joy & McMunigal, supra note 28, at 43.
58. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.o9(b) (West 1999) (stating that the offense of tampering with
or fabricating evidence does not apply if the record, document, or thing concealed is privileged); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c) (2oo6) ("This chapter does not prohibit or punish the providing of lawful,
bona fide legal representation services in connection with or anticipation of an official proceeding.").
59. See Lefstein, supra note 28, at 918-21.
60. See In re Olson, 222 P-3 d 632, 638-39 (Mont. 2009) (finding that a criminal defense lawyer
who acted in accordance with the ABA Criminal Justice Standards by taking possession of items of
child pornography in defending his client did not violate Montana's version of Model Rule 3.4(a) or
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solace to the lawyer forced to defend herself in a criminal prosecution or
disciplinary matter. Indeed, the mere threat of criminal prosecution or
disciplinary sanctions may well chill some defense lawyers from taking
action that a zealous advocate ought to be willing to take in defending a
client.6 ' Although it may be good policy not to prosecute criminal
defense lawyers whose conduct is consistent with that seemingly
demanded by professional norms,62 a defense lawyer with a particularly
contentious relationship with local prosecutors undoubtedly is at some
risk.6
C. CASE LAW
In 1966, Ryder would not have been able to look to Standard 4-4.6
for assistance. Standard 4-4.6 appeared for the first time in 1993 in the
third edition of the Defense Function Standards.6 4 Had he searched for
guidance from other cases, it is likely that the only case Ryder would
have found would have been State ex rel. Sowers v. Olwell." Nothing in
Olwell suggests that the defense lawyer acted unethically in taking
possession of the knife his client used in a stabbing." Although the court
indicated that the lawyer had a duty to turn over the knife to the
authorities at some point, the court expressly found that the lawyer could
withhold the knife "for a reasonable period of time."6 Moreover, the
Olwell court agreed that even though counsel had to surrender the knife
in response to the prosecutor's subpoena duces tecum, the prosecutor
would not be allowed to reveal to the jury that defense counsel was the
source of the knife.6

8.4(b)-(d) or Montana's tampering with evidence statute, because there was no evidence he intended
to tamper with physical evidence or to prejudice the administration of justice); Commonwealth v.
Stenhach, 514 A.2d 114, 125-27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
61. Green, supra note 44, at 354; Lefstein, supra note 28, at 925-28.
62. See Green, supra note 44, at 366. For a brief discussion of the reasons why lawyers are not
prosecuted, see HAZARD ET AL., supra note 31, at 39.
63. Lefstein, supra note 28, at 919. Professor Lefstein describes an unreported case,
Commonwealth v. Schaffner, involving the criminal prosecution of Schaffner, a criminal defense
lawyer. Id. Following a discussion with his client, a suspect in a homicide investigation, Schaffner sent
his agent to recover a knife from a city park. Id. The client shortly thereafter got a new lawyer and
Schaffner gave the knife to the client's brother to deliver to the new lawyer. Id. (citing No. 81-CR- 1
37
(Kenton Cnty. Cir. Ct. Ky. 1982 (unreported)). The knife never surfaced and Schaffner was
prosecuted for violating Kentucky's tampering with physical evidence statute. Id. The jury acquitted
Schaffner. Id. Despite the risk of prosecution, "no reported decision involves the imposition of
criminal sanctions against a criminal defense lawyer who retains physically incriminating evidence
which the lawyer was required to produce." HAZARD ET AL., supra note 31, at 39.
64. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUsTICE: DEFENSE FUNCrION (3d ed.1993).
65. 394 P.2d 681 (Wash. 1964).
66. Id. at 682-83.
67. Id. at 684.
68. Id. at 685 ("Therefore, the state, when attempting to introduce such evidence at the trial,
should take extreme precautions to make certain that the source of the evidence is not disclosed in the
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Since the Ryder decision, a smattering of cases around the country
have discussed the duty of defense counsel with respect to physical
evidence given to counsel or her investigator6 by her client'o or by a third
person." In most of these cases, courts have rejected the notion that
either the principle of confidentiality or the attorney-client privilege
shields evidence from seizure by the State simply because a client gives
an evidentiary item to her attorney or to a member of the attorney's
staff." Indeed, courts have consistently held that law offices could not
become depositories for a client's illicit property or for incriminating
items connected to that client's possible criminal conduct." Courts
undoubtedly do not want to encourage clients to attempt to hide an
evidentiary item by giving it to counsel, or to empower lawyers to
unfairly hinder law enforcement's efforts to gain access to evidence.
Fearful that a defense lawyer's retention of evidence might frustrate the
search for truth, many courts have held that if a defense lawyer or her
investigator takes physical possession of an item of physical evidence, she
is ethically required on her own, even without a court order or subpoena,
to turn over such item to the authorities.74
In some states, therefore, case law clearly limits what defense
counsel may do if she or her investigator takes possession of
incriminating physical evidence. In California, for example, a criminal
defense lawyer who takes possession of an item of physical evidence has
no option but to turn the item over to the authorities." California law
obligates lawyers to turn over physical evidence to the authorities
regardless of whether defense counsel received the evidence from a third
person" or retrieved the evidence based on a privileged communication

presence of the jury and prejudicial error is not committed."). For a critical look at the underpinnings
of Olwell and the extent to which the duty imposed on defense counsel voluntarily to produce
incriminating evidence compromises the criminal defendant's Fifth Amendment passivity rights, see
Kevin Reitz, Clients, Lawyers, and the Fifth Amendment: The Need for a Projected Privilege, 41 DUKE
L.J. 572 (1991).
69. See, e.g., Clutchette v. Rushen, 77o F.2d 1469, 1471-73 (9th Cir. 1985).
70. See, e.g., Olwell, 394 P.2d at 683-84.
71. See, e.g., Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 12io (Alaska 1978).
72. See, e.g., People v. Lee, 83 Cal. Rptr. 715,722 (Ct. App. i97o).
73. See, e.g., Magill v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355, 389 (Ct. App. 2oo) (ordered
unpublished), as modified on denial of reh'g, (Jan. 29, 2001).
74. See, e.g., In re Original Grand Jury Investigation, 733 N.E.2d 1135, 1139-40 (Ohio 2000).
75. See Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985); People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46,
53-54 (Cal. 1981); People v. Superior Court (Fairbank), 237 Cal. Rptr. 158, 161-63 (Ct. App. 1987);
Lee, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 722. But see Evan A. Jenness, Hot Potatoes: The Perplexing Problem of Evidence
of Crime, CNrY. BAR UPDATE (Mar. 20o0), http://www.lacba.org/showpage.cfm?pageid=il583 (arguing
that while California law requires lawyers to disclose or to deliver fruits or instrumentalities of a crime

to the authorities sua sponte, ordinary materials with evidentiary significance need not be disclosed
sua sponte, but only if required by a court order or subpoena).
76. Lee, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 722.
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from her client." Not only must California lawyers turn over the evidence
sua sponte,'7 but whenever counsel or her investigator removes or alters
evidence, counsel must also disclose the original location of the item,
even though counsel learned of the location as a result of a confidential
client communication." Given California case law, a California lawyer
who instructs her investigator to go retrieve a clearly incriminating item
will be ensuring that the prosecution gains access to evidence that may be
critical in convicting her client. Such lawyering does not measure up to
the competent, zealous advocacy called for by the ABA Standards."

D.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS

Section ii9 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers also favors the mandatory disclosure or turn-over rule espoused
by a majority of courts that have addressed the question of defense
counsel's duties regarding items of incriminating physical evidence.
Section ii9, entitled "Physical Evidence of a Client Crime," states:
With respect to physical evidence of a client crime, a lawyer:
(i) may, when reasonably necessary for purposes of the
representation, take possession of the evidence and retain it for the
time reasonably necessary to examine it and subject it to tests that do
not alter or destroy material characteristics of the evidence; but
(2) following possession under Subsection (i), the lawyer must

notify prosecuting authorities of the lawyer's possession of the
evidence or turn the evidence over to them."
Although an earlier draft of section i i9 allowed lawyers to return
evidence to the source if that could be accomplished without destroying
or altering material characteristics of the evidence,8 the final version of
section ii9 rejected such an approach."' Comment c to section ii9
acknowledges that some decisions have "alluded to an additional
option-returning the evidence to the site from which it was taken, when

that can be accomplished without destroying or altering material

77. Clutchette, 77o F.2d at 1472 (holding that if counsel's investigator retrieves an evidentiary item
and gives it to counsel, counsel is also required to turn it over to the authorities).
78. SuperiorCourt (Fairbank),237 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63.
79. Meredith, 631 P.2d at 54.
8o. Clutchette, 770 F.2d at 1470. The lawyer instructed his investigator to retrieve some receipts
that the investigator herself later turned over to the police. Id. Although the receipts were, in fact, "the
cornerstone of the prosecution's case against Clutchette," counsel's decision to move the receipts from
their original location created a duty on his part to turn them over to the prosecution. Id. at 547o, 1472.
The court found that the receipts were properly admissible against Clutchette. Id. at 1472-73.
8s. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNcION § 4-1.2 & cmt. ( 3 d ed. 1993).
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119 (2ooo).
83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 179(2)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 8, Mar.
21, 1997).

84. See

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ II9 (2oo).
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characteristics of the evidence."" Comment c concludes, however, that
this option "will often be impossible."" Moreover, such an option would
be unavailable if counsel reasonably should know that the client or
another person will intentionally alter or destroy the evidence.87
Nonetheless, neither comment c nor the Reporter's Note to section 119
explains why this option ought not be available in those circumstances
where the item can, in fact, be promptly returned to the source and counsel
has no reason to believe that the item will be altered or destroyed.
E.

ABA STANDARD 4-4.6

For some legal scholars who have addressed the physical evidence
quandary, the return-to-the-source rule reflects a sounder, more nuanced
approach." Standard 4-4.6 embraces an approach that seeks to balance
defense counsel's duty of loyalty to her client with her duty as an officer
of the court not to hinder unfairly the prosecution's access to evidence.
Standard 4-4.6 acknowledges that, ordinarily, defense lawyers cannot
simply receive and retain hysical evidence related to an investigation or
pending criminal charges. The commentary to Standard 4-4.6 echoes the
oft-repeated notion that "law offices must not become depositories for
physical evidence."' Standard 4-4.6(a) does not generally require lawyers,
however, to deliver physical evidence to law enforcement authorities
unless required to do so by law or a court order, or as provided in 44.6(d)." Rather, Standard 4-4.6(b) states:
Unless required to disclose, defense counsel should return the item to
the source from whom defense counsel received it, except as provided in
paragraph (c) and (d). In returning the item to the source, defense counsel
should advise the source of the legal consequences pertaining to possession
or destruction of the item. Defense counsel should also prepare a written
record of these events for his or her file, but should not give the source a
copy of such record."

85. Id. § I19 cmt. c.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Lefstein, supra note 28, at 928-29, 937-38. But see Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Communications Falling Within the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 IOWA L. REV. 811, 829-40 (1981)
(arguing that the attorney-client privilege should be interpreted to preclude clients from showing
documents and other physical evidence to their lawyers and then not disclosing that evidence to the
government, and should also be interpreted to permit the government to compel a lawyer to testify
against the client about any nondisclosed evidence counsel had in her possession).
89. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.6 cmt. at 193 (3d ed. 1993).
9o. Id.
91. Id. § 4-4.6(a) ("Defense counsel who receives a physical item under circumstances implicating
a client in criminal conduct should disclose the location of or should deliver that item to law
enforcement authorities only: (s) if required by law or court order, or (2) as provided in paragraph
(d).").
92. Id- § 4-4-6(b)-
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Thus, Standard 4-4.6 contemplates that normally defense counsel will not
keep possession of incriminating evidence but will return the item of
physical evidence to the location or person from whom counsel received it.93
Standard 4-4.6 recognizes, however, that at times, defense counsel
may have to temporarily retain possession of physical evidence. Standard
4-4.6(c) expressly allows defense lawyers to possess physical evidence
temporarily, including contraband, for a limited period of time before
returning the item to the source.94 That provision reads:
Defense counsel may receive the item for a reasonable period of
time during which defense counsel: (I) intends to return it to the

owner; (2) reasonably fears that return of the item to the source will
result in destruction of the item; (3) reasonably fears that return of the
item to the source will result in physical harm to anyone; (4) intends to
test, examine, inspect, or use the item in any way as part of defense
counsel's representation of the client; or (5) cannot return it to the
source. If defense counsel tests or examines the item, he or she should
thereafter return it to the source unless there is a reason to believe that
the evidence might be altered or destroyed or used to harm another or
return is otherwise impossible. If defense counsel retains the item, he
or she should retain it in his or her law office in a manner that does not
impede the lawful ability of law enforcement authorities to obtain the
item."

The commentary to Standard 4-4.6 provides the rationale for the
Standard's markedly different approach from both Restatement section
Ii9 as well as that demanded by the majority of courts that have
addressed the physical evidence dilemma.9 Noting that other provisions
of the Defense Function Standards trumpet the importance of
encouraging frank communication between lawyer and client, the
commentary stresses that protecting client confidences is critical if
93. Id. § 4-4.6 cmt. at 194 ("This rule of return to the source applies whether the source is the
client, a third party, or a physical location.").
94. Id. §4-4.6(c). Paragraph (d) deals with contraband. It currently reads:
If the item received is contraband, i.e., an item possession of which is in and of itself a
crime such as narcotics, defense counsel may suggest that the client destroy it where there is
no pending case or investigation relating to this evidence and where such destruction is
clearly not in violation of any criminal statute. If such destruction is not permitted by law or
if in defense counsel's judgment he or she cannot retain the item, whether or not it is
contraband, in a way that does not pose an unreasonable risk of physical harm to anyone,
defense counsel should disclose the location of or should deliver the item to law
enforcement authorities.
Id. § 4-4.6(d). Because (d) only requires disclosure or delivery in the situation where the item
cannot be safely retained, the obvious implication is that unlike other physical evidence, counsel
should generally retain contraband instead of returning it to the source. Id.
95. Id. § 4-4.6(c).
96. Most state court decisions argue that a mandatory disclosure rule is necessary to avoid
defense counsel racing the police to the scene to take possession of evidence or to discourage clients
from using lawyers' offices as a hiding place for evidence. i HAZARD &HODEs, supra note 31, §9.29, at
9-121.
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lawyers are to establish and maintain a good attorney-client
relationship.' Without such a relationship, it would be difficult for
counsel to provide effective representation. The commentary to Standard
4-4.6 concludes, therefore, that mandating that defense counsel turn over
all physical evidence to the police or prosecutor will discourage candid
client-lawyer communication, compromise a full defense investigation,
and ultimately, undermine trust between client and defense counsel.0
Certainly some in the academic community question the need for
strong confidentiality rules." These critics point out that there are already
a number of recognized exceptions both to the attorney-client privilege
and to the ethical duty of confidentiality as articulated in Model Rule
I.6." In their view, there is little evidence to suggest that the existence of
such exceptions has undermined attorney-client relationships or the ability
of criminal defense lawyers to represent their clients effectively."o' Thus,
they argue, requiring lawyers to warn clients about an additional
exception whereby counsel might be obligated to disclose or turn over
incriminating physical evidence will not significantly affect the client's
willingness to trust his lawyer. Nor will such a warning adversely affect
the client's willingness to disclose fully all relevant facts to counsel.
Simply put, the critics are wrong. o2 A sound attorney-client
relationship is based on trust, and in my experience, absent that trust,
few criminal defendants will fully disclose all relevant facts to counsel.'
In the first scenario, for example, Smith's ability as an indigent defender

97. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE

FUNCTION §4-4.6 cmt. at

192

(3d ed. 1993) (citing

H§4-3.1, 4-3-2, 4-3.7 cmt.).

98. Id. § 4-4.6 cmt. at 196.
99. See, e.g., Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosures of Client Confidences to Prevent
Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. Io91, 1o97-99 (1985); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA
L. REv. 351, 355 (1989); William H. Simon, The Confidentiality Fetish, ATLANTIC, Dec. 2004, at 113,
115-16.
too. Subin, supra note 99, at 1143-44; Zacharias, supra note 99, at 352 n-5; Simon, supra note 99, at
115.

ior. Zacharias, supra note 99, at 378 ("[W]hile a preference for nondisclosure rules exists, a

substantial majority of laypersons would continue to use lawyers even if secrecy were limited.").
1o2. A full defense of the need for strong confidentiality rules and of the importance of
confidentiality to effective representation is beyond the scope of this Article. For a broader discussion
of the importance of confidentiality to effective lawyering, especially in the criminal defense context,
see generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITr, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (4th ed. 2010);
John B. Mitchell, Reasonable Doubts Are Where You Find Them: A Response to Professor Subin's
Positionon the Criminal Lawyers' "Different Mission", I GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 339 (1987).
103. My view is based on six years as a public defender in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, fourteen years as
a clinical professor handling criminal cases, countless conversations with criminal defense lawyers at
CLEs and conferences across the U.S., and the observations of other commentators such as Anthony
Amsterdam, Monroe H. Freedman, and Abbe Smith. See, e.g., I ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL
MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 80 (1984); FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note o2, at 12839. In Swidler & Berlin v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that "a substantial number
of clients and attorneys think the privilege encourages candor." 524 U.S. 399,409 n.4 (1998).
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to gain Brown's trust'" depends largely on her willingness to look her
client in the eye and pledge her loyalty, including her firm commitment
to maintain the confidentiality of their communications. Convincing an
indigent client to trust a defense lawyer provided and paid for by the
State is never easy. If the defender offers a weak pledge of
confidentiality, detailing a long list of exceptions that permit or require
counsel to disclose her client's confidences, then it becomes virtually
impossible to secure the client's trust. In practice, conscientious defense
lawyers understand this reality and generally give an absolute pledge,
because they believe it is the only viable way to gain the trust of most
mistrustful indigent defendants.'" Having given that pledge and gained
the client's confidence, most criminal defense lawyers are loath to betray
their clients unless they have no other choice.
That does not mean that defense counsel can alter, conceal, or
destroy relevant evidence. Such conduct is undoubtedly improper.6
Nonetheless, defense counsel's duty not to alter, conceal, or destroy
evidence does not imply a corresponding duty to preserve evidence for
the prosecution. Under our adversary system, defense counsel does not
have an affirmative obligation to assist the prosecution in obtaining
physical evidence, even though that evidence may be critical to the
successful prosecution of defense counsel's client.'" Rather, defense
counsel's role in the adversary system is to zealously advance her client's
"undivided interest," not the interests of the State.' As Justice White
eloquently summarized:
Law enforcement officers have the obligation to convict the guilty
and to make sure they do not convict the innocent. They must be
dedicated to making the criminal trial a procedure for the
ascertainment of the true facts surrounding the commission of the
crime. To this extent, our so-called adversary system is not adversary at
all; nor should it be. But defense counsel has no comparable obligation

to ascertain or present the truth. Our system assigns him a different
mission. He must be and is interested in preventing the conviction of
the innocent, but, absent a voluntary plea of guilty, we also insist that
he defend his client whether he is innocent or guilty. The State has the
obligation to present the evidence. Defense counsel need present
104. Many have discussed the difficulty that indigent defenders face in overcoming the mistrust of
their clients. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 761 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
io5. See FREEDMAN & SmrrH, supra note 102, at 137-40, 162-65; Abbe Smith, The Difference in
CriminalDefense and the Difference It Makes, II WASH. U. J.L. &POL'Y 83, 119-22 (2003).
io6. ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 3.4(a) & cmts. 1, 2 (2007). Sadly, not all
lawyers adhere to this clear command. See, e.g., United States v. Scruggs, 549 F.2d io97, so99 (6th Cir.
1977) (affirming the convictions of two defense lawyers who, in the course of defending their client,
accepted stolen money as a fee, lied about the money to authorities, and then burned the money).
io7. See, e.g., Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 81o, 816-17 (Iowa 1999).
io8. As Justice Powell observed, "a defense lawyer best serves the public, not acting on behalf of
the state or in concert with it, but rather by advancing 'the undivided interests of his client."' Polk

Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,318-19 (1981) (quoting Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204
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nothing, even if he knows what the truth is. He need not furnish any
witnesses to the police, or reveal any confidences of his client, or
furnish any other information to help the prosecution's case. If he can
confuse a witness, even a truthful one, or make him appear at a
disadvantage, unsure or indecisive, that will be his normal course. Our
interest in not convicting the innocent permits counsel to put the State
to its proof, to put the State's case in the worst possible light, regardless
of what he thinks or knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly there are
some limits which defense counsel must observe but more often than
not, defense counsel will cross-examine a prosecution witness, and
impeach him if he can, even if he thinks the witness is telling the truth,
just as he will attempt to destroy a witness who he thinks is lying. In
this respect, as part of our modified adversary system and as part of the
duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we countenance
or require conduct which in many instances has little, if any, relation to
the search for truth'N

Standard 4-4.6 reflects Justice White's view of defense counsel's role
in the adversary system. Although counsel may not unfairly or illegally

obstruct access to evidence, a defense lawyer certainly ought not be in
the business of knowingly aiding the prosecutor to secure evidence that
implicates her client. Accordingly, in the course of properly defending
one's client, a criminal defense lawyer may properly take action that will
frustrate the truth and the prosecutor's ability to win a conviction."o A
lawyer may properly advise a client to refuse to speak to the police,
thereby preventing the police from securing a confession from a client
who otherwise might be willing to talk.' A defense lawyer may also, for
example, properly cross-examine a witness she knows is truthful in an
effort to discredit that witness."' Defense counsel may also refuse to
divulge the location of physical evidence, even though she knows that her
refusal may well prevent law enforcement authorities from ever
obtaining this evidence."' Her refusal does not constitute hindering or
obstructing justice, even though defense counsel's deliberate failure to
cooperate with law enforcement may enable her guilty client to escape
conviction.

I09. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part) (footnotes omitted).
iio. See 2 HAZARD & HODEs, supra note 50, § 29.12, illus. 29-5 (discussing a case where defense
counsel is ethically permitted to present truthful testimony, even though it will create a false,
misleading impression for the jury).
III. As Justice Jackson observed, "[Alny lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no uncertain
terms to make no statement to the police under any circumstances." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59
(1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
112. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-7.6 (3d ed. 1993); Mitchell,
supranote 102, at 346-49.
113. See People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798, 802-o3 (Onondaga Cnty. Ct. 1975), affd mem.,
376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiam, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976); see also
Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 81o, 816 (Iowa 1999).
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F.

RYDER'S DILEMMA REVISITED
In the situation that Ryder faced, the fact that Ryder learned that
there was stolen money in the client's safety deposit box did not create a
duty to disclose the whereabouts of the money to law enforcement
authorities. To the contrary, Ryder was obligated to keep that information
confidential."' Under the circumstances, Ryder should have discussed
with his client the advantages and disadvantages of attempting to
negotiate a deal with the prosecutor at that point, compared to simply
leaving the money where it was, and waiting to see if the authorities
could secure a search warrant and develop sufficient evidence to charge
and convict the defendant. Any discussion of the money itself should
have been handled very carefully, including warning the defendant of the
adverse consequences of destroying or continuing to conceal the
evidence."'
In Ryder's situation, there was absolutely no reason for him to have
taken possession of the stolen money unless he was doing so because he
intended to promptly return it to the owner. Standard 4-4.6 encourages
counsel to take such action, but she must do so within a "reasonable
period"" 6 and "in the way best designed to protect the client's
interests."" In the case of stolen money, it would not be reasonable to
retain the money any longer than was reasonably necessary to make the
arrangements to deliver the money to the bank. Standard 4-4.6 would not
provide Ryder a safe harbor given his testimony that he intended to
return the money only after it was safe to do so at the end of the
investigation or the case against his client.
Assuming that Ryder went to the safety deposit box with the intent
of taking the money and promptly delivering it back to the bank, what
should he have done with the sawed-off shotgun he discovered? Given
his belief that it was the weapon used in the bank robbery and with no
reasonable belief that it could possibly be a piece of potentially
exculpatory evidence, given his knowledge of the alleged crime, Ryder
should have left the shotgun exactly where he found it. If defense counsel
is unsure of her duties regarding a particular item of physical evidence,
generally she should seek advice or do research before taking possession
of the evidence. If the situation is such that she has no time to consult
with another or do any research, then she ought to decline to take

1.6

R.

114. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr
GOVERNING LAWYERS §6o (2ooo). The information was

(2oo);

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

OF LAW

also protected by the attorney-client privilege.

See People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46,51-53 (Cal. 1981).
115.

See

STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE

supra note 28, at 919-20.
116. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
117. Id. § 4-4.6(e).

JUSTICE: DEFENSE

FUNCTION §4-4.6(b) (3d ed. 1993); Lefstein,

FUNCTION §4-4.6(c) (3 d ed.
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possession of an item absent a reasonable belief that the item is
potentially exculpatory.
III. UNPACKING THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE SCENARIOS
This Part of the Article explores the limitations of the mandatory
turnover rule by looking at the three physical evidence scenarios set
forth earlier. This Part then turns to an extensive look at In re Olson, a
recent Montana case involving a criminal defense lawyer accused of
ethical violations for retaining physical evidence that he collected while
defending his client.
A.

THE BROWN CASE

In the Brown scenario noted earlier,"'8 neither Sally Smith nor her
investigator should go to the dumpster to try to retrieve the weapon.
Nothing in the facts of the scenario suggests that any exculpatory
evidence might be preserved by securing the knife."' Thus, there is no
legitimate reason for Smith to take possession of the knife, and doing so
only puts her in a complicated dilemma that may end badly for her or for
her client. Consequently, Brown has nothing to gain but much to lose if
Smith takes possession of the weapon.
Unfortunately, some criminal defense lawyers do not focus on their
"responsibility of furthering the defendant's interest to the fullest extent
that the law and the applicable standards of professional conduct
permit."'2 o Certainly the defense lawyer in People v. Meredith"' lacked
that focus. In that case, defense counsel learned from his client who was
accused of murder that he had thrown a wallet belonging to the victim in
a burn barrel behind his house."' Without consulting his client, counsel
instructed his investigator to retrieve the wallet. As instructed, the
investigator found the wallet and gave it to counsel who promptly turned
it over to the investigating detective."' Defense counsel betrayed his
client, but the opinion offers no explanation as to why counsel acted in
total disregard of his client's best interests. Counsel was not taking
possession of the wallet to test, to examine, or to use the evidence in a
manner consistent with properly defending his client. Perhaps counsel
II8. See discussion supra Part I.A.
119. See discussion supra Parts I.A-C. In all three scenarios, defense counsel should try to gain as
much information as possible from her client and other sources before making any decision regarding
taking possession of physical evidence. The final decision should be the client's. See infra notes 148 &
213 and accompanying text.
120. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-1.2 cmt. at 122 (3d ed. 1993); see,
e.g., Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725-26 (1948) (stating that the right to counsel demands
undivided allegiance and service devoted solely to the interests of the client).
121. 631 P.2d 46 (Cal. 1981).
122. Id. at 49.
123. Id.
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acted under the misguided belief that knowledge of the whereabouts of
physical evidence required him as an officer of the court to recover the
evidence in order to assist the prosecution to convict a guilty person. Or
perhaps he had his investigator retrieve the evidence without fully
considering the consequences of doing so and then, having taken
possession of the wallet, felt he had no option but to deliver it to the
authorities. Possibly, he was more interested in currying favor with local
law enforcement authorities than with effectively defending his client and
gave little thought to the ramifications of his actions.
As will be discussed in more detail later, sometimes circumstances
make it extremely difficult for defense counsel or her investigator to
recognize whether an item has evidentiary value or whether it may, in
fact, be exculpatory as opposed to inculpatory. In People v. Meredith,"'
Clutchette v. Rushen,'25 and Ryder, however, none of the lawyers should
have taken possession of the evidence involved in the case. In none of
these cases was there any reasonably foreseeable possibility that taking
possession of the evidence was necessary to aid in any way in counsel's
defense efforts. It was not uncertainty about the potential exculpatory
nature of the evidence, but apparent confusion about their ethical
responsibilities that led the lawyers in these cases astray. In the end, the
lawyers in Meredith and Clutchette bungled their ethical responsibilities
to the obvious detriment of both of their clients. In Ryder's case,
although he was motivated both to help his client and to act within
ethical bounds, his missteps led to his own downfall.
B.

RETURNING EVIDENCE TO THE OWNER OR THE SOURCE

Standard 4-4.6 was drafted to provide lawyers like Ryder the
guidance necessary to enable them to successfully navigate their way
through similar ethical thickets. Had Ryder reviewed Standard 4-4.6 and
discussed it with the retired judge he consulted, he presumably either
would have not gone to his client's safety deposit box or would have
gone to remove the stolen money for the purpose of returning it
promptly to the bank that his client had robbed. Relying on 4-4.6, he
would have temporarily retained the money in his office, where it still
may have been seized pursuant to a search warrant or a court order."'

124.

Id.

F.2d 1469 (9th Cir. 1985). In Clutchette, counsel had his investigator recover some
incriminating receipts which the investigator turned over to the police. The court noted that counsel
should not have sought to take possession of the receipts because doing so was unnecessary to the
defense of the case. Id. at 1473.
126. Had he taken only the money, Ryder might still have faced disciplinary charges. Nevertheless,
in that case, if his intent to return the money promptly per Standard 4-4.6 could have been
corroborated, he would have been in a markedly better position to defend his actions.
125. 77o
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Within a few days, he should have arranged to have the money delivered
to the bank in a manner that best protected the identity of the client.
In the shoplifting scenario,' Tom Black may want to speak with
someone in the prosecutor's office about returning the shoes for an
agreement not to prosecute his client. The merits of this approach may
turn on the client's record, the value of the shoes, Black's relationship
with the prosecutor, the policies of that prosecutor's office, and the
policies of the store involved. For various reasons, that approach may be
foreclosed. Even if it is viable, the client may be disinterested because of
the risk or certainty of a criminal conviction. Black may then believe that
his client's interest would best be served by assisting her to get the shoes
back to the department store. Since the client has not simply thrown the
shoes away but has sought his legal advice, she presumably would be
receptive to that advice. Standard 4-4.6(c) permits Black to take
possession of the shoes for the purpose of returning them to the rightful
owner. It allows Black to do so even though the shoes are the fruits of a
crime that the police are actively investigating. Moreover, the
commentary to Standard 4-4.6 states that it is proper for the delivery to
be made to the owner anonymously or through another lawyer."'
If, during. their discussion, the young woman says that she has
changed her mind and does not want the shoes delivered to the store for
fear she will be linked to the shoes despite counsel's effort, then what are
Black's options? He need not confiscate the shoes merely because she
brought them into his office. Even if she left them in his office while she
went to an ATM or to check her parking meter, Black's temporary
possession of the shoes ought not trigger a duty to retain them and then
to deliver them to the authorities. Indeed, if a lawyer's brief examination
of an item of physical evidence constitutes possession triggering a duty to
retain and to deliver the item to the authorities, then the ability of clients
to obtain effective legal advice and counsel would be unduly restricted."'
Consistent with Standard 4-4.6(c), Black should be permitted to let the
woman leave with the shoes absent some reasonable basis to believe she
intends to destroy them. The mere possibility that she may dispose of
them is not enough to warrant Black's seizure of the shoes, because that
possibility exists in every case, and such a low threshold would effectively
eviscerate the return-to-the-source option.

127. See discussion supra Part I.B.
128. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.6(d) cmt. at 196 (3d ed. 1993); see
also Dean v. Dean, 6o7 So. 2d 494 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (advising defense counsel to return the
proceeds of embezzlement to the authorities or to the rightful owner, but without revealing client
communications about the proceeds).
129. See I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 31, § 9.29, at 9-124 (acknowledging that if a client is
proffering physical evidence to the lawyer, the client has the right to be told what the lawyer will do
with the evidence and can demand it back, even though the client may then hide the evidence).
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One objection to Black's returning the shoes to the store is that
doing so may interfere with the prosecution's ability to find the shoes in a
location that connects the client with the stolen shoes.'30 Thus, counsel's
intervention may make it more difficult, or perhaps even impossible, to
secure the conviction of a guilty person, thereby undermining the fair
administration of justice. Additionally, opponents worry that the returnto-the-source alternative will allow evidence to be routinely destroyed.13 1
Admittedly, both concerns are legitimate. Black's goal in returning
the stolen shoes is not only to mitigate the consequences of the client's
offense, but also to complicate the ability of the authorities to connect his
client to a crime. Yet, defense counsel's role generally is to force the
prosecution to shoulder the burden of proof, not to make that burden
easier.3' The defendant's decision to consult with an attorney ought not
put her in a worse position by compelling counsel to hand over to the
prosecution the evidence it needs to secure a conviction. "[Olur
accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the government
seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its
own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of
compelling it from his own mouth."'33 Counsel ought to be able to deliver
evidence to the authorities in a manner that requires them to labor to
make the requisite connection to her client rather than demanding that
counsel turn over an item in a manner that essentially acknowledges her
client's involvement in a crime."
Although not all courts agree that the client's identity ought to be
protected under such circumstances,"' considerable authority exists to
protect a defendant's words and conduct if counsel receives physical
evidence as part of a legitimate attorney-client communication. ,6 Thus,
even though many courts mandate that physical evidence must be
voluntarily disclosed to the authorities, those same courts usually
preclude the prosecution from establishing at trial how it came into

130. See Layton, supra note 28, at 75; Saltzburg, supra note 88, at 838.
131. Layton, supra note 28, at 81.
132. I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 31, § 9.29, at 9-121 (observing that requiring lawyers to
voluntarily turn over physical evidence does make the police officer's job easier).
133. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
134. The commentary to Standard 4-4.6 states that it is proper to deliver an item anonymously or
through bar counsel's office. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.6 cmt. at 196
( 3d ed. 1993). But see Lefstein, supra note 28, at 936-37 (rejecting the anonymous approach, and
saying courts should have final say as to whether client identity should be protected).
135. See, e.g., Hughes v. Meade, 453 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Ky. i97o); see also Saltzburg, supra note 88,
at 828-41 (arguing that defense lawyers should be required to disclose physical evidence, and the
attorney-client privilege ought not protect the client from being identified as the source); authorities
cited infra note 142.
136. See, e.g., People v. Meredith, 639 P.2d 46, 51-53 (Cal. 1985); People v. Belge, 372 N.Y.S.2d
798, 803 (Onondaga Cnty. Ct. 1975), affd mem., 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), affd per
curiam, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976).
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possession of the evidence.137 Moreover, "the cases requiring voluntary
disclosure of incriminating evidence are all limited to non-testimonial
evidence, precisely the category of evidence that is not protected by the
Fifth Amendment."38 Nonetheless, even though defense counsel should
make every effort to prevent the prosecution from informing the jury
that counsel was the source of a particular item of evidence,'" some
courts have construed the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights and the
attorney-client privilege very narrowly in the physical evidence context. 4 o
A criminal defendant ought not be required to sacrifice his Fifth
Amendment right as a cost of consulting with counsel or seeking
counsel's assistance in defending criminal charges. 4 ' Not only does a
mandatory disclosure rule run counter to the tradition of client loyalty, it
may enable the government to obtain from defense counsel voluntarily
what it cannot constitutionally obtain from a defendant by use of a
subpoena.[42 Unquestionably, courts and commentators disagree as to the
precise interplay between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and the
attorney-client privilege when dealing with physical evidence, especially
documents and writings, given to defense counsel by her client.'43 Yet,
even if one accepts the constitutionality of the turn-over doctrine,
defense counsel ultimately ought not be required both to disclose
incriminating evidence and then to be compelled to lay the foundation
linking the evidence to her client.'"

137. See I HAZARD &HODES, supra note 31, § 9.29, at 9-123.
138. 2 HAZARD &HODES, supra note 5o, § 30.5, at 30-14.
139. See, e.g., Anderson v. State, 297 SO. 2d 871, 873 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); People v. Nash, 313
N.W.2d 307, 313 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, affd in part, 341 N.W.2d 439 (Mich.
1983); State ex reL Sowers v. Olwell, 394 P.2d 681, 685 (Wash. 1964); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDucr R. 1.6 (20o); Lefstein, supra note 28, at 937.
14o. See, e.g., State v. Burrell, Nos. 9805012046, 9805012033, 1999 WL 167770, at *4 (Del. Super.
Ct. Mar. 12, 1999); see also Magill v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355, 384 (Ct. App. 2001)

(ordered unpublished).
141.
142.

See Reitz, supra note 68, at 650; see also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
See, e.g., Hyder v. Superior Court, 625 P.2d 316, 320 (Ariz. 1981) (stating that counsel was not

required to comply with a subpoena seeking a letter the client wrote, because the letter was protected
by the Fifth Amendment and therefore protected by the attorney-client privilege); Commonwealth v.
Hughes, 404 N.E.2d 1239, 1243 (Mass. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 900 (i98o) (citing Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 411-12 (1976)) (finding that defendant was not required to produce a weapon he
allegedly possessed, because to do so would implicitly authenticate it in violation of his Fifth
Amendment rights).
143. Lefstein, supra note 28, at 901-15; see also I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 31, § 9.13, at 9-51 to
9-54 (discussing the interplay between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and the attorney-client
privilege and counsel's duty to maintain her client's confidences); Reitz, supra note 68 (exploring the
extent to which a criminal defendant's rights of testimonial passivity are adversely affected by
requiring counsel to turn over incriminating evidence she possesses).
144. 2 HAZARD & HODEs, supra note 50, § 30.5, at 30-15; see Sanford v. State, 21 S.W-3d 337, 344
(Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (reversing a conviction because testimony was admitted that defense counsel was
the source of information that led the police to the evidence linking the defendant to the crime).
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Although counsel's action in returning the shoes may frustrate the
state's ability to proceed with a criminal prosecution, counsel's
intervention will have ensured that stolen property has been promptly
returned to the rightful owner, limiting the damage done to the victim. It
may well be that the lawyer's ability to forge a relationship of trust with
her client caused the client to seek counsel's advice. Absent such a
relationship, the client may have simply thrown the shoes away, making
it very unlikely that the evidence would have been available for use
against the defendant anyway. Thus, without counsel's intervention, law
enforcement may well have never recovered the stolen shoes, and the
store would have permanently lost its property. Moreover, regardless of
counsel's efforts to make it more difficult for the authorities to connect
the shoes to Black, the police may still be able to link the returned
evidence to the defendant and still successfully prosecute her. On
balance, therefore, the potential costs identified by the opponents of the
return-to-the-source rule may well be exaggerated, and they are clearly
outweighed by the damage done to the attorney-client relationship and
to legitimate defense investigation by a mandatory turn-over rule.
Indeed, in Dean v. Dean, Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal
recognized that it promoted public policy to permit a lawyer to return
stolen property to the police without being compelled to identify the
client.'45 Defense counsel successfully argued that under the circumstances
of the case, the attorney-client privilege should extend to cover his
client's identity, even though counsel was hired specifically to facilitate
the return of the stolen property. As the Dean court noted:
Surely there is a public purpose served by getting stolen property in the
hands of the police authorities, even if the identity of the thief is not
thereby revealed. Here the consultation resulted in exactly that.
Krischer advised his client to turn over the property to the state
attorney or the police. A lawyer's advice can be expected to result in
the return of the property if the confidentiality of the consultation is
insured."'
As for the claim that returning an item to the source will routinely
lead to the destruction of evidence, that risk also exists whenever defense
counsel fails to take possession of evidence. No one suggests that defense
counsel has an affirmative obligation to seek out and gain possession of
incriminating physical evidence to preserve it for the prosecution. Such
an obligation would turn defense counsel into an agent of the state,
acting against the best interests of her client. Instead, defense counsel is
usually cautioned not to take possession of incriminating physical
evidence and to warn a client of the consequences if she is to take

145. 6o7 So. 2d 494,499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
146. Id.

1992).
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possession-the item will be turned over to the prosecution.'47 Properly
warned, few clients are likely to give such evidence to counsel or to her
investigator, and many may choose to hide or destroy the evidence.14
The return-to-the-source rule merely puts the defendant in the same
position she would have been in had counsel not taken possession of
evidence because of her inexperience, inadequate communication with
her staff, or the possible exculpatory nature of the item.
In the vast majority of cases discussing defense counsel's
responsibilities in handling items of incriminating physical evidence, the
lawyers who took possession of the evidence had absolutely no strategic
or legitimate reason to do so.'49 Although a defense lawyer cannot alter,
conceal, or destroy evidence, or advise another to do so, she does not
have a corresponding duty to preserve incriminating evidence not in her
possession or control.' Unquestionably, in cases in which defense counsel
inexplicably took possession of incriminating evidence and then turned
that evidence over to the authorities, the defendant would have been
much better off had she never consulted counsel. As opposed to the
worrisome image of defense counsel racing to the scene of a crime to
grab evidence to keep it from the prosecution, counsel's intervention in
these cases ensured that damning evidence was delivered to the
authorities- even though, but for counsel or her investigator's actions, it
might never actually have found its way into the prosecutor's hands."'
The best interests of these defendants were unwittingly compromised by
lawyers who apparently did not appreciate their role or fully understand
their ethical responsibilities.

147. West Virginia State Bar, LEI 98-02 (Sept. 4, 1998) ("However, if the lawyer removes the
potential evidence or alters the potential evidence, whether to examine and test it or for whatever
reason, then the original location and condition of the evidence will likely lose the protection of the
attorney-client privilege."); see also Colorado Ethics Handbook, Formal Op. 6o (July 24, 1982).
148. Professors Hazard and Hodes recognize that clients need to be told what will happen to the
evidence if counsel retains possession, and that once warned, the client "will indeed probably take
back the evidence and hide it himself." I HAZARD & HODEs, supranote 31, § 9.29, at 9-124.
149. See, e.g., People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46,53-54 (Cal. 1981).
150. See i HAZARD & HODES, supra note 31, § 9.29, illus. 9-4, at 9-85 (discussing a hypothetical
similar to People v. Belge and noting that lawyer duty bound to withhold information from the
authorities and that "no exception even arguably applied"); see also Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d
1469, 1473 ( 9 th Cir. 1985) (noting that the defense lawyer would have discharged his duties had he
simply left evidence where it was located). Such an affirmative duty would be wholly inconsistent with
the zealous advocate role espoused by Justice White in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-58
(1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
151. As the court noted in Clutchette v. Rushen, had the defense counsel simply left the physical
evidence in its original resting place, he could have successfully shielded his knowledge of the location
of the evidence from the authorities. 77o F.2d 1469, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1985).
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INRE OLSON: HANDLING CONTRABAND

In contrast to the lame representation provided to the defendants in
cases like Clutchette and Meredith, the recent case of In re Olson"'
highlights the difficulty that the physical evidence dilemma presents to
the conscientious criminal defense lawyer when dealing with contraband.
Olson had been a lawyer for thirteen years and was the Chief Public
Defender in Cascade County when he took on the representation of
Kelly Mortenson."3 Mortenson and her husband were charged with
thirty-eight counts of sexual abuse of children following a search of their
apartment in which various items of possible child pornography were
seized.S4 After interviewing his client, Olson hired an investigator, Dan
Kohm, to assist him and began exploring the viability of a compulsion
defense.'
Within two weeks of undertaking his representation of Mortenson,
Olson was contacted by Mortenson's mother who suggested that there
were items in the Mortenson's apartment that Olson should view."'
Olson and Kohm promptly went to the apartment and collected various
items that they believed "would be potentially helpful in formulating a
defense," including thirteen photographs.' These photographs had
apparently been downloaded from the Internet and each depicted young
girls posing erotically."' Olson had Kohm tag and seal the items and then
take them to Kohm's office, where they were securely stored.' Prior to
removing the items, Olson and Kohm were aware both that an eviction
notice had been issued to the Mortensons and that the Great Falls Police
Department had searched and released the apartment.
Although neither Olson nor Kohm believed that the items were
child pornography, they recognized that others might conclude
differently.'6 ' Given that possibility, Kohm questioned if they could be
subject to prosecution for possessing the items. Consequently, Olson
conferred with Tony Gallagher, the Chief Federal Defender in Montana,
who had extensive experience defending child pornography cases.I"2
Gallagher opined that the items were not pornographic, but he

222 P.3d 632 (Mont. 2009).
Id. at 634.
Id.
Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
152.
153.
154.
155.

158. Id.
159. Id.

16o. Id.
161. Id. at 634-35. Olson would testify that because he believed the items were not pornographic,
he also did not consider the items to be contraband. Id.
162. Id. at 635. Despite his years of experience, neither Olson nor anyone in his office had ever
previously handled a child pornography case. Id. at 634.
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encouraged Olson, nevertheless, to seek an ex parte protective order in
case someone might conclude otherwise."' Gallagher clearly did not
believe that Olson had acted unethically or unprofessionally in taking
possession of the items. 6 4 As he would subsequently testify, Gallagher
believed that Olson had an obligation to gather such items in preparing
his client's defense, and he did not have a duty to turn over the
information at that point.'6 '
Olson acted on Gallagher's advice and obtained a protective
order.'6 He also hired a forensic psychologist to evaluate Mortenson and
to advise him regarding his theory of defense.'6 The psychologist not
only agreed with Olson's compulsion theory, but also concurred that the
photographs were not pornographic.'6
Within ten days of removing the items from his client's apartment,
Olson received an email from the state prosecutor informing Olson that
the case would likely be handled by federal authorities and the state
charges dismissed.'6 Later that month, Olson was hired to be training
coordinator for the Office of the Montana State Public Defender.' As a
result of the prosecutor's email and his new job, Olson did not go
forward with his defense of Mortenson.M
Prior to leaving the Cascade County Public Defender's Office,
Olson did not turn over any of the seized evidence to the authorities. 72
He did seek to speak with Carl Jensen, the lawyer assigned to take over
Kelly Mortenson's case, but Jensen stated he was too busy to meet and
asked Olson for a memo.'7 ' After receiving that memo, Jensen contacted
Kohm and ordered him to take all of the items and deliver them to the
state prosecutor.7 4 Remarkably, Jensen ordered the delivery of items
without even reviewing any of the evidence and without discussing the
matter with Olson or Mortenson. 7
The Montana Office of Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC") eventually
charged Olson with violating Montana Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4,
arguing that he unlawfully obstructed another party's access to evidence
163. Id. at 635.
164. See id.
165. Id.

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172.

Id.

173. Id.
174. Id.

175. Id. The opinion notes that the evidence included "some of Kelly Mortenson's private writing,"
items which may well have been protected from disclosure even had the state subpoenaed them. Id. at
636.
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and/or concealed documents or other material having potential
evidentiary value.' The ODC also complained that Olson violated
Montana Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(b), because he tampered with
or fabricated physical evidence, as proscribed by Montana Code section
45-7-207." Finally, the ODC alleged that Olson violated Montana Rule
of Professional Conduct 8.4(c) by virtue of his "dishonest and deceitful
conduct" and Rule 8.4(d) because his conduct was "prejudicial to the
administration of justice."'
The Montana Commission did not find any misconduct on Olson's
part. Rather, the Montana Commission rightfully concluded that "his
conduct was a 'text book example' of the type of functioning expected of
defense counsel."'7 The Commission emphasized that Olson had a clear
duty to conduct a diligent investigation and found that, as part of such
investigation, it may be necessary for defense counsel to take possession
of evidentiary material in order to make a judgment about its possible
utility in defending the client.'" It also stressed that Olson had a "good
faith belief" that the items taken from the apartment needed to be
examined, because they possibly supported a defense, included
privileged material, and were not child pornography or contraband.'8 ' In
addition, the Montana Commission found that because Olson preserved
the evidence in a safe manner and sought a protective order, there was
no evidence that he intended to commit the offense of tampering with
evidence.'

The Montana Supreme Court adopted the recommendations of the
Montana Commission and found that the ODC failed to prove that
Olson violated Rule 3.4 or 8.4.'8 It dismissed the complaint against Olson
despite disagreeing with the Montana Commission's conclusion that the
disputed photographs were not examples of child pornography.' In the
court's view, however, the nature of the seized evidence was not
dispositive, thereby implicitly recognizing, as did the Montana
176. Id.
177. Section 45-7-207 reads:

Tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. (i) A person commits the offense of
tampering with or fabricating physical evidence if, believing that an official proceeding or
investigation is pending or about to be instituted, the person:
(a) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any record, document, or thing with purpose to
impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation ....
Mor. CODE ANN. § 45-7-207 (2oo9).
178. In re Olson, 222 P-3d at 636 (internal quotation marks omitted).
179. Id. at 637.

18o. Id.
181. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

182. Id.
183. Id. at 638.
184. Id. ("[I]t is difficult for the Court to comprehend how anyone would not 'know' that these are
examples of child pornography.").
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Commission, that defense counsel may need to temporarily take
possession of an incriminating item, even if it is contraband, in order to
carry out her duty to prepare a defense for her client.'8 ' Nor did the court
find that defense counsel was required to deliver the item to the
authorities immediately, stating that "Olson was not, at that point in the
proceedings, obligated to turn the items over to the police or prosecutor
by virtue of a statute or court order."' The majority did not indicate
whether Olson would have been obligated to turn over the evidence sua
sponte at some point, even without a court order.'' The court did note
that the Montana Commission properly relied on the ABA Criminal
Justice Standards for guidance in analyzing this issue.'
The Montana court also quickly disposed of the Rule 8.4 allegations,
finding neither evidence of Olson's intent to tamper with physical
evidence nor sufficient evidence to find that he was "dishonest or
deceitful" or that his conduct was "prejudicial to the administration of
justice."'8' In so holding, the majority clearly rejected the dissent's
position that Olson both violated Rule 3.4 and was guilty of concealing
evidence in violation of section 45-7-207.'

In the end, the court's

decision affirms the legitimacy of Olson's conduct in responding to the
dilemma he confronted.
Both the Montana Commission and the Montana Supreme Court
seemed to appreciate the difficulty of the predicament that Olson faced.
Olson was intent on providing his client a vigorous defense. He
conducted a lengthy client interview, retained an investigator and
forensic expert, and began a prompt investigation to develop a viable
defense theory. When alerted that possible evidence may be at his
client's apartment, he promptly went there with his investigator."' Given
the nature of his possible defense and the uncertain status of the
photographs, his decision to collect the evidence was professionally
reasonable. His decision was clearly not designed to thwart the
prosecution's access to evidence or to conceal evidence. After all, the
authorities already had full access to this evidence and, for whatever
reason, decided not to take possession of the items.' Indeed, Olson

185. Id.
186. Id.
187. The concurring opinion observed that had counsel intended to use the items at trial, he would
have been prohibited from concealing contraband or physical evidence, suggesting that Olson at some
point would have been required sua sponte to disclose them. Id. at 640. (McGrath, C.J., concurring).
188. Id. at 638 (majority opinion).
189. Id. at 638-39.
19o. Id. at 639.
191. Id. at 634. In going to the apartment with his investigator, Olson was better positioned to resolve
questions as to whether to collect evidence or to leave it where he found it. In addition, the presence
of the investigator gave him a witness to attest to the propriety of his actions.
192. Id. Nothing in the record suggests that the items were hidden in the apartment and

HeinOnline -- 62 Hastings L.J. 1207 2010-2011

i

208

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 62:1I177

knew that the police had already searched the apartment and released
it.'93 He had no reason to think that the police had any intention of
returning to the apartment to conduct any additional searches.
Just as courts are properly concerned that law offices not become
depositories for physical evidence, courts also do not want lawyers and
their investigators to race the police to a possible crime scene to grab
evidence and thereby interfere with the ability of law enforcement
officials to investigate crimes and successfully prosecute criminals."
Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes argue that while the turn-over rule
"run[s] counter to the tradition of client loyalty, any other rule would
inevitably degenerate into a race between the police and a suspect's
lawyer to be first to take possession of evidence."' Certainly in some
instances, the timing of defense counsel's actions, the nature of the items
collected, the crime involved, and counsel's intent may warrant a finding
that counsel violated a state's analogue to Model Rule 3.4 or a criminal
tampering statute.' In the vast majority of criminal cases, however,
concerns about lawyers racing the police to the scene are completely
unfounded. The vast majority of criminal defendants in this country are
indigent.' As in Olson, rarely are public defenders or appointed counsel
involved in a case until charges have been issued and the police
investigation already concluded.' Moreover, too few indigent defense
lawyers even have access to investigators, and many lack the time to
conduct any investigation."' Those defense lawyers who undertake an
appropriate investigation as called for by Standard 4-4.1 are almost
always trying to find evidence long after the events related to their
clients' charges occurred.2 o
Unquestionably, there are cases in which defense counsel ought not
to disturb evidence that is clearly both incriminating and unrelated to
any possible defense. Such a decision may well mean that such evidence
never gets to the authorities. In Olson, had he not collected the items in

undiscovered until Mortenson's mother located them.
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., People v. Meredith, 631 P.2d 46,53 (Cal. 1981).
195. I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 31, § 9.29, at 9-121.

196. For a case in which a lawyer purposefully disposed of certain incriminating physical evidence
and was prosecuted for hindering the prosecution of a felon, see State v. Werdell, 136 P-3 d 17, 18 (Or.
2oo6). The conviction was overturned on appeal, however, because the court found that the
defendant's acts did not constitute a crime, given the precise wording of Oregon's hindering statute.
Id. at 21.
197. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOWE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTIcs, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NCJ-I 02 ,
79
3
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 5 (2ooo).

198. See Douglas L. Colbert, Connecting Theory and Reality: Teaching Gideon and Indigent
Defendants' Non-Right to Counsel at Bail, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 167, 170, 182 (2006).

199. See Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 206 Wis. L.
REV. 739, 77982.
200. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.1 (3d ed. 1993).
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the apartment, they would have been either thrown out with the trash,
retained by the apartment owner, or possibly, turned over to the police.
It is highly unlikely that the police were actually going to return to the
apartment to continue to search for evidence. What is clear, however, is
that had Olson decided to leave the items in the apartment, he may well
have forfeited his ability to use the evidence should he have later
determined that the evidence might have helped in the defense of his
client.
Both the Montana court and the Montana Commission were
understandably concerned that defense counsel be given some leeway in
collecting potential evidence that may prove exculpatory. Obligating
defense counsel to disclose immediately all evidence to the authorities
will discourage zealous defense counsel from ever taking possession of an
item unless it is obviously exculpatory. As the next scenario illustrates,
however, items of evidence cannot always be easily identified as
exculpatory or inculpatory. Penalizing a conscientious lawyer like Olson
under the circumstances of this case would deter other defense lawyers
from collecting potentially exculpatory material because the risk to their
clients and to themselves would be too great. A mandatory disclosure
rule, therefore, chills legitimate defense investigation and, ultimately,
compromises the ability of defense lawyers to represent their clients
effectively.
To his credit, Olson was motivated to provide his client with an
effective defense. The dissent, however, paints a very different picture of
Olson, claiming that he misled Judge McKittrick to secure the protective
order.2 o' Yet, Judge McKittrick testified on Olson's behalf at that
disciplinary hearing, saying that he was an aggressive lawyer just trying to
investigate his client's case.o2 Had Judge McKittrick felt he was
purposely misled by a sharp lawyer who lied to him, he would not have
hesitated to criticize Olson at the hearing. Instead, Judge McKittrick
expressed his view that use of the tampering statute to expose criminal
defense lawyers to criminal liability merely for investigating charges
lodged against their clients would have a chilling effect on defense
lawyers."
D.

THE DAMAGED CAR SCENARIO

Given the story that Wall related to Jones in this scenario,2 o4 Jones
would be remiss in not going to Wall's garage or at least sending an
investigator to look at Wall's car. Standard 4-4.1 encourages defense
201. In re Olson, 222 P-3d 632,641-42 (Mont. 2009) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (claiming Olson misled
Judge McKittrick at the ex parte hearing regarding where and how he obtained the photographs).
202. Id. at 635 (majority opinion).
203. Id.
204. See discussion supra Part I.C.
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counsel to do a prompt investigation, and here, the circumstances
demand that Jones or her investigator at least inspect the car.2 oS At this
point Jones does not know if her client committed any criminal offense
other than driving under the influence during the previous night. Once
she inspects the car, however, Jones will be in a better position to make
an informed recommendation to Wall as to how they should proceed.
Assuming that Jones, along with some member of her office, goes to
the garage and inspects the damaged car, 6 she and her client will face
some difficult decisions. For example, she may wish to take photographs
of the damage if she is confident that those photographs will be protected
by the attorney-client privilege.' Yet taking such photographs is never
risk-free." For various reasons, the photographs may end up in the
hands of law enforcement authorities to the detriment of the client.
The more challenging question is what, if anything, she should do
with the bloody smear. Her visual inspection of the damage may be of
limited help or very revealing. The nature and extent of the damage may
also be instructive. Based on her experience or that of her investigator,
Jones may now be in a much better position to recommend action. On
the other hand, Jones may still be totally unable to decide if the damage
and smear are the result of Wall hitting an animal, a person, or an
object." No one can tell by visual inspection alone whether the
substance is human or animal blood, or even blood at all."o
If Jones has the substance tested and it is determined to be animal
blood, Wall would not only be greatly relieved, but also extremely wellpositioned to defend against any criminal charge. There is a significant
risk, however, that testing may well reveal that the substance is, in fact,
human blood. By conducting a test, therefore, counsel may be preserving
very incriminating evidence that ultimately may lead to Wall's conviction
205. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION

§ 4-4.i(a) (3d ed.

1993)

("Defense

counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case . . . .").
206. Counsel should be wary of inspecting the car by herself. If Jones does not have an investigator
to accompany her, then she should bring a law clerk or paralegal with her. Counsel needs to minimize
the possibility that she will become a necessary witness and be forced to withdraw as counsel. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDuCT R. 3.7 (2010). On the other hand, time may be of the essence, so

Jones may need to run that risk if she cannot find anyone to accompany her to view the car.
2o7. Authority suggests that such photos would be protected. See People v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d
798, 803 (Onondaga Cnty. Ct. 1975), aff'd mem., 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975), aff'd per
curiam, 359 N.E.2d 377 (N.Y. 1976); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 119 (2000).
But see Magill v. Superior Court, 1o3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 355, 393 (Ct. App. 2001) (ordered unpublished)
(holding that defense photos of a car believed to have been involved in an accident were not protected
by the attorney-client privilege).
2o8. See infra notes 233-245 and accompanying text.
209. This scenario assumes that the accident occurred in one of the many places in the U.S. where

collisions with deer or other animals are relatively common.
21o. To determine if an alleged bloodstain is in fact blood, confirmatory tests must be conducted
because paint, rust, ketchup, shoe polish, dye, and ink all visually resemble blood. ANDRE A.
MOENSSENS ET AL., SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES 982-83 (5th ed. 2oo7).
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of a serious crime. Thus, prior to making any decision to test, Jones must
ascertain whether there is a sufficient amount of the substance such that
she can take a sample to test without eliminating the ability of the police
to test the substance should they discover the evidence. If she tests the
sample and discovers it is human blood-and, therefore, possibly
incriminating once compared with the victim's blood-she need not
disclose the evidence sua sponte, however, as long as a sufficient quantity
still exists to allow for testing should the police investigation lead to
Wall's car."' If testing will use up the entire sample, however, and then
Jones decides to test anyway, she is obligated to reveal the results to the
authorities even if doing so might prove incriminating."'
The decision to test is, therefore, very risky. Indeed, because any
decision regarding taking possession of physical evidence includes the
risk that such evidence may have to be turned over to law enforcement,
counsel should, whenever feasible, consult with her client before taking
possession of such evidence. As this situation highlights, since testing the
substance may exculpate Wall or supply the critical evidence that may
well lead to his conviction, the decision whether to test ultimately ought
to be Wall's."' After discussing Wall's concerns and interests, Jones
should give Wall her best advice as to how to proceed given the range of
potential options. Unquestionably, Jones's advice must include how she
will respond if the testing reveals human blood. One option that might be
considered is preserving a sample of the substance and only having it
tested if the situation later warrants it.214 In the end, Jones should act
based on Wall's choice.
It is extremely likely that Wall will ask what he can do with the car if
he does not want to take the risk of testing the substance or, in the
211. Defense counsel arguably has not removed evidence from its location if she has neither made
it more difficult for law enforcement to find the substance nor taken steps to hinder or obstruct the
police from discovering it.
212. Counsel may not even be able to make this determination without having an expert come
inspect the car.
213. The significance of the decision demands that the client generally have the final say on the
decision to take physical possession of or to test physical evidence. For an extended look at the
difficult question of whether defense counsel or the client should have the final say in important
tactical decisions and the related issue of when defense counsel might override a client's wishes
regarding a significant tactical decision, see generally Rodney J. Uphoff, Who Should Control the
Decision to Call a Witness: Respecting a Criminal Defendant's Tactical Choices, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 763
(2ooo).
214. Washington & Lee Professor Tim MacDonnell suggested this option at an ABA sponsored
round table discussion of this scenario. Tim MacDonnell, Professor, Washington & Lee Univ. Sch. of
Law, Remarks at the ABA Roundtable at Washington & Lee University School of Law (Nov. 19,
2010) (discussing the draft revisions to the ABA Criminal Justice Standards for Prosecution and
Defense Functions). The merits of the option turn on counsel's assessment of a host of factors,
including access to an expert, time pressures, counsel's relationship with local prosecutors, the
diligence and competence of the local police, the interests and fears of the clients, and other facts
related to the situation that counsel may have already learned.
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interim, while they are waiting to have the substance tested. In either
instance, Jones should warn Wall of the dangers of altering the condition
of the car, especially since a test of the bloody smear might exculpate
him. Jones should also caution Wall that altering, concealing, or
destroying evidence is a crime. Even though Wall may push for more
guidance as to what he can do with the car, any advice that Jones gives is
potentially very problematic. Clearly she cannot suggest that Wall get the
damage repaired or that he wash the car. She cannot suggest that he take
the car out of the jurisdiction, given that the police may be actively
looking for any registered white car. Even advising Wall to stop driving
the car and to keep it in the garage could be construed as encouraging
him to conceal evidence."' In short, Jones may not be able to offer much
advice regarding the car other than to repeat the admonition that
altering or destroying evidence may lead to additional charges.
In some instances, defense counsel may well want to have another
lawyer or a member of her staff present during this discussion to ensure
that the client cannot later claim that he was advised to dispose of or
destroy the evidence. Although a client may decide to take steps to get
rid of certain evidence, counsel cannot in any way encourage the client to
do so or suggest how it can best be accomplished. Such advice would be
clearly improper and may appropriately subject the lawyer to criminal
prosecution, a disciplinary proceeding, or both.2'
E. Too MUCH OR Too LIrrLE ZEAL
As this damaged-car scenario highlights, defense lawyers at times
face an exceptionally difficult challenge in deciding whether to take
possession of or test an uncertain item of physical evidence. Few defense
lawyers want to take any action that might contribute to their clients'
conviction. Standard 4-4.6 rightfully acknowledges this difficulty and
allows counsel to return evidentiary items to the source, thereby
encouraging counsel to conduct a vigorous investigation."' Restatement
section i i9, on the other hand, while recognizing the necessity of defense
lawyers taking possession of evidence to examine or test the items in
preparation of a defense, still insists that counsel, after a reasonable time,
notify the authorities or deliver the evidence to them."" Demanding the
215. On the other hand, if the forecast is for rain, counsel's suggestion that Wall drive the car could
be interpreted as encouraging the client to alter or destroy evidence. Thus, counsel ought to advise
Wall to maintain the status quo by keeping the car in the garage until she has an opportunity to
explore Wall's alternatives.
216. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § is (2000).
217. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.6 cmt. at 193-94 (3d ed. 1993).
218. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING § II9 cmts. b, c (2ooo). Comment 2 to Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.4 also recognizes that a lawyer can take temporary possession of
incriminating physical evidence "for the purpose of conducting a limited examination that will not
alter or destroy material characteristics of the evidence" and notes that "applicable law may require

HeinOnline -- 62 Hastings L.J. 1212 2010-2011

May 20II]

THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE DILEMMA

I2I3

delivery of all such evidence to law enforcement will chill defense
investigation. Zealous defense lawyers will be extremely reluctant to take
possession of evidentiary items at all, if doing so always requires
disclosure to the authorities."'
It is not excessive zeal, however, but too little zeal by too many
criminal defense lawyers that threatens the integrity and fair
administration of the criminal justice system in this country.220 Compare,
for example, the efforts taken by Olson to try to marshal a defense for
Kelly Mortenson with the efforts of another Montana lawyer, Eduardo
Falla."' From 1994 to 1997, as the chief contract lawyer in Flathead

County, Montana, Falla never had a jury trial, filed a suppression
motion, or got a case dismissed.' Or consider the representation that
Carl Jensen provided to the defendant after he took over for Olson. The
record does not reflect why Jensen concluded he was obligated to
immediately deliver the items to the prosecution. Perhaps he carefully
researched the issue and concluded that he had a mandatory disclosure
obligation. Given his failure to discuss the matter with Olson or to review
the items to make an evaluation of whether any particular item
warranted different treatment-for example, Mortenson's private
writings-his haste in turning over the evidence is inconsistent with the
careful consideration that conscientious defense counsel ought to give to
such a tough issue.
Regrettably, neither the Standards nor ethical norms appear to be a
major concern for a sizable number of criminal defense lawyers around
the country, handling crushing caseloads in a perfunctory manner.223 Too
many defense lawyers have so many cases that they do not have the time
or resources to do even basic investigation or research, let alone to
wrestle with complex, time-consuming ethical dilemmas. Lawyers
providing their clients ineffective assistance of counsel or, at best,
marginally competent representation, may not fully appreciate their
ethical responsibilities. Rarely will such lawyers take the time to do any
research, consult with another lawyer, or sort through ethical nuances to
determine how they should respond to a particular dilemma they face.
Thus, it is not so much the danger of defense lawyers rushing to the
crime scene to disturb evidence that threatens the integrity of the
the lawyer to turn the evidence over to the police or other prosecuting authority, depending on the
circumstances." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4 cmt. 2 (2olo) (emphasis added).
219. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.6 cmt. at 193 (3d ed. 1993).
22o. See FREEDMAN & SMrrIH, supra note lo2, at 123-26; Bruce A. Green, CriminalNeglect: Indigent
Defense from a Legal Ethics Perspective, 52 EMORY L.J. 1169, 1169-70 (2003).
221. See Alan Berlow, Requiem for a Public Defender, AM. PROSPECT (Nov.

30, 2002),

http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=requiem-for_a_publicdefender.
222.

Id.

See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Grieving Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70
REv. 1615, 1620 (2002).
223.
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criminal justice system, but a failure of many defense lawyers to do an
adequate, timely investigation that undermines the functioning of the
adversarial system. In addition, it is the failure of law enforcement
authorities to adequately investigate or properly preserve evidence that
poses a more serious systemic problem than that of defense lawyers
destroying or concealing evidence. The Brenton Butler case highlighted
in the award-winning documentary Murder on a Sunday Morning
represents a glaring example of police shortcutting that almost led to the
conviction of an innocent teenager." Fortunately for Butler, excellent
defense lawyering resulted in a not guilty verdict despite the eyewitness
testimony of the victim's spouse and the testimony of several police
officers who claimed that Butler confessed to the murder.225 Months after
the trial, one of Butler's lawyers learned from another client that an
inmate had bragged to him about the murder, and the lawyer passed this
information onto the police."2

The police then tested some physical

evidence that they had collected initially but failed to test, because they
were convinced that Butler committed the murder.' This testing
confirmed that the other inmate was the murderer."'
Similarly, in Arizona v. Youngblood, the police took a sample from
a victim who identified Larry Youngblood as his attacker."' The sample
was not properly preserved, so it could not be tested.23 o Youngblood was
convicted, and his complaint that the case should be dismissed because
the police destroyed potentially exculpatory evidence eventually found
its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. Citing the overwhelming evidence
against him, the Supreme Court reversed the Arizona Court of Appeals
and reinstated Youngblood's conviction, holding that the defendant
failed to demonstrate that the loss of the evidence stemmed from any
bad faith on the part of the police.23 ' Years later, however, more
sophisticated DNA testing established that Youngblood was innocent
and that another inmate had, in fact, victimized the young boy who had
erroneously identified Youngblood."'

224. The documentary was directed by Jean-Xavier DeLestrade. MURDER ON A SUNDAY MORNING
(Centre Nationale de la Cin6matographie 2001).
225. Uphoff, supra note i99, at 765-67.
226. Paul Pinkham, Police Charge2 in May Tourist Slaying,FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville), Mar.

13, 2001, at AI.
227.
228.

Feb.

See id.
See id.; Rich Tucker, Last Sentence in Slaying, Butler Debacle,FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville),

1,2003,

at B3.

488 U.S. 51, 53 (1988). For a detailed discussion of Youngblood, see Uphoff, supra note 199,
at 767-79.
230. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 55231. Id. at 58.
232. Uphoff, supra note 199, at 777-79.
229.
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If the adversary system is to function properly, defense lawyers must
not only have access to investigators and expert assistance, they must be
able to conduct an investigation without fear that their investigation will
unearth-or create-critical evidence that will ultimately lead to their
client's convictions. Take, for example, Ronald Hall, a federal public
defender in Kansas City who interviewed a young woman from Texas
who the authorities believed had kidnapped and killed an infant she had
been babysitting.233 During his client interview, Hall stepped out of the
room and requested-and later obtained-a map of Texas.' Hall
returned to the interview room and had his client draw a detailed map
showing where his client had buried the baby.' Hall forwarded the two
maps to his client's lawyers in Texas who unsuccessfully fought a
subpoena demanding that the maps be turned over to the authorities.236
After the court ordered the maps to be disclosed, the authorities used
them to find the baby's body.237
The maps were neither introduced into evidence at the defendant's
trial nor was any mention made of them."' The victim's body, however,
was a critical piece of the prosecution's case, and that evidence, the
defense claimed, was secured in violation of the attorney-client
privilege.239 Contrary to the trial court, the appellate court found that the
maps were a fruit of privileged communication. 4 Nonetheless, the court
concluded that under the facts, the attorney-client privilege was
"legitimately required to yield to the strong public policy interest of
protecting a child from death or serious bodily injury."24 ' Although the
standard proposed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals may be
appropriate, its application in this case seems particularly strained given
the "remote possibility" that the baby was alive.242
Nonetheless, Henderson represents another compelling illustration
of the difficulties that conscientious defense lawyers face in trying to
zealously, but ethically, represent a criminal defendant. Hall unwittingly

233. Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544,549 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 550.
238. Id. at 551.
239. Id.

240. Id. at 557.
241. Id.

242. Id. This decision represents a good example of the judiciary's willingness to carve out a specific
and newly minted exception to a well-established general principle in order to reach what the majority
feels is the appropriate result in a particularly thorny situation. For an excellent discussion of the
extent to which certain judicial decisions may reflect a "reconsidering" by the court in light of fuller
information, as opposed to examples of the bench and bar's different visions of the law, see generally
Fred C. Zacharias, Are Evidence-RelatedEthics Provisions "Law"?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315 (2oo7).
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created the physical evidence that led to his client's demise.243
Undoubtedly, Hall believed that the map that his client drew was a
confidential, privileged communication that could not be seized by the
authorities. Section iI9 of the Restatement certainly supports such a
belief.2 " Yet, once this potentially very incriminating evidence was
created, Hall could not be certain that his client's other lawyers-or the
courts -would share his view of the protected nature of the map.245 In the
end, Hall's efforts to aid his client backfired dramatically.
IV. STANDARD 4-4.6: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS
As a number of commentators have observed, the courts and the
bar have a different vision of the importance of client confidentiality.24 6
For the bar, confidentiality must be jealously protected, because it is
critical to fostering the trust that is the "hallmark" of the attorney-client
relationship.247 Although the courts acknowledge the importance of
confidentiality, judges are often quite willing to find exceptions to the
attorney-client privilege, to construe the privilege narrowly, or to find
that the privilege has been waived in a particular case in order to
minimize the negative impact of the privilege on the search for truth.4
It is not surprising, then, that Standard 4-4.6 is more protective of
the attorney-client relationship, more sensitive to the importance of an
unencumbered defense investigation, and less concerned with facilitating
the successful conviction of an accused person than are many of the
judicial decisions on the subject of defense counsel's handling of physical
evidence. As the commentary to the Standard observes:
If counsel were required to promptly turn over all physical evidence
received from a client or some other source relating to an investigation
or pending criminal charges, counsel would refrain both from receiving
any such evidence or searching for it, whether or not it might help his

or her client. Such a policy of restraint would unduly hamper defense
243. Henderson received the death penalty but has not been executed. Offenders on Death Row,
http://www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/offendersondrow.htm (last visited May. 23,

TEx. DEP'T CRIM. JusT.,
2011).

244. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§ IIg (2000).

245. Id. In Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200, 1207 (Alaska 1978), defense counsel turned over to the

authorities kidnapping plans written by his client that counsel had received from a third party.
Although Morrell is distinguishable because evidence received from a third party is not covered by the
attorney-client privilege, the requirement that counsel disclose physical evidence could easily be
misunderstood or misconstrued, as did the trial court in Henderson, to require counsel to disclose the
map drawn by the client. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.6 cmt. at 194
(3d ed. 1993) (cautioning counsel not to give a written record to client or source for fear that this
"secondary piece of physical evidence" could compromise the client's interests).
246. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 7o N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1390
(1992).

R.i.6, cmt. 2 (2010).
248. See Fred C. Zacharias, HarmonizingPrivilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEx. L. REV. 69,73-75
(1999)247. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcT
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counsel's obligation to undertake as full a factual investigation as
possible."
The commentary concludes, therefore, that "to assure effective
representation, defense counsel must be encouraged to acquire physical
evidence if he or she believes the client's defense might genuinely be
enhanced thereby.""o
Nonetheless, Standard 4-4.6 is not designed to provide a safe harbor
for unscrupulous lawyers or a vehicle to enable clients to hide
incriminating evidence safely with their lawyers."' Rather, Standard 4-4.6
represents a thoughtful approach that seeks to balance a defense
counsel's conflicting duties to her client and her duties as an officer of
the court. By rejecting the more rigid mandatory disclosure or turn-over
approach, Standard 4-4.6 offers a more nuanced framework for lawyers
seeking to reconcile their conflicting duties in a manner that does not
harm their clients. Moreover, as Olson demonstrates, the Standard can
influence courts to resolve tough cases in a way that does not punish
counsel for acting in a professionally proper manner or her client for
confiding in her lawyer.
An ABA Task Force reviewed the existing ABA Criminal Justice
Standards for Defense Function and proposed various revisions. Those
draft revisions went, in turn, to the ABA Criminal Justice Standards
Committee and ultimately will go to the Council of the ABA Criminal
Justice Section for debate, revision, and approval.' Proposed Standard
4-4.8 is the revised version of current Standard 4-4.6. Most importantly,
Standard 4-4.8 wisely retains the return-to-the-source perspective of
Standard 4-4.6 and it virtually tracks the same language as Standard 44.6. The only significant change set forth in 4-4.8 is the inclusion of a new
paragraph (a) that reads: "Defense counsel should not tamper with,
conceal, or destroy physical evidence which may incriminate the client,
unless authorized by the court."' Somewhat similar language can be
found in the current commentary to section 4-4.6, cautioning that "[i]t is,
accordingly, improper and may even be criminal conduct for a defense
attorney to alter, conceal, or destroy relevant items of physical evidence
that are the lawful subject of such legal process."25 4

249. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION

§ 4-4.6 cmt. at 193 (3d ed.

1993).

250. Id.

251. Id. ("[I]t is also ordinarily improper for attorneys simply to receive and to retain such
evidence. As mentioned, law offices must not become depositories for physical evidence.").
252. See Memorandum from Bruce A. Green, Professor of Law, to Rodney J. Uphoff, Professor of
Law (Feb. 2010) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal) (describing the process and soliciting the
participation of academics, lawyers and judges in a series of roundtables to discuss the proposed
revisions (on file with the Author); Memorandum from Bruce A. Green, Professor of Law, to Rodney
J. Uphoff, Professor of Law (Dec. 2oo9) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal) (same).
253. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.8 (Proposed Revisions 2009).
254. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.6 cmt. at 192 ( 3 d ed. 1993).
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Presumably, the proposed change is designed only to emphasize that
criminal defense lawyers are not immune from the prohibition barring
anyone from concealing, altering, or destroying physical evidence.
Assuming that is the case, then the drafters should add the word
"unlawfully" to minimize the possibility that the Standard will be
misread or misconstrued to mean that merely taking temporary
possession of evidence constitutes tampering or concealing."' Moreover,
the new commentary must reinforce this point by keeping the current
language that encourages defense counsel to acquire physical evidence if
she believes doing so may enhance her client's defense,256 as well as the
language that permits defense counsel to retain items for a reasonable
period of time."'
Although Standard 4-4.8 appropriately adopts Standard 4-4.6's
nuanced approach, the proposed Standard fails to address some of its
flaws. The commentary to Standard 4-4.6 warns the defense attorney not
to alter, conceal, or destroy relevant items of physical evidence.25 Yet,
neither the Standard nor the commentary sufficiently cautions defense
counsel and her investigator not to take possession of items that are
clearly incriminating. Taking possession of an item always creates the
risk that evidence will be altered and also ensures, at least temporarily,
that the police will have a reduced opportunity to discover the item in a
relevant location. By encouraging defense counsel only to take
possession of an item that might genuinely enhance the client's defense,
the commentary implicitly recognizes that it can be difficult at times to
determine the potential exculpatory nature of some evidentiary items. In
those instances where the incriminating nature of an item is obvious,
however, defense counsel is not justified in removing the item from its
location or in temporarily possessing the item and running the risk of
altering it in some fashion-by smudging incriminating fingerprints, for
example.
Not only should the commentary emphasize that defense counsel
and her investigator ought not handle physical evidence that is obviously

255. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUcr R-3.4(a) (2010)

("A lawyer shall not unlawfully

obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or
other material having potential evidentiary value.").
256. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.6 cmt. at 193 (3d ed. 1993)
("Indeed, to assure effective representation, defense counsel must be encouraged to acquire physical
evidence if he or she believes the client's defense might genuinely be enhanced thereby.").
257. Id. § 4-4.6 cmt. at 195 ("Notwithstanding the general rule of return to the source, evidence
given to defense counsel during legal consultation for information purposes and used by counsel in
preparing the defense of his or her client's case, whether or not the case ever goes to trial, can be
retained for a reasonable period of time.").
258. Id. § 4-4.6 cmt. at 192 ("It is, accordingly, improper and may even be criminal conduct for a
defense attorney to alter, conceal, or destroy relevant items of physical evidence that are the lawful
subject of such legal process.").
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incriminating, but it also should advise criminal defense lawyers to
examine carefully the criminal statutes in their jurisdiction whenever
they contemplate taking possession of any physical evidence. As noted
earlier, such statutes rarely offer defense lawyers a clear safe harbor from
criminal prosecution even when counsel has taken possession of evidence
solely for the purpose of rendering legitimate legal services. 9
Nonetheless, counsel is in a better position to fend off disciplinary action
or criminal charges if she can demonstrate a good faith belief that
acquiring the evidence was reasonably related to her client's defense.
Good prosecutors and fair-minded disciplinary boards recognize
that conscientious defense lawyers must have the ability to take
temporary possession of physical evidence if they are to render effective
assistance of counsel to their clients. A broad reading of hindering or
obstructing justice statutes would unduly chill defense lawyers from
performing tasks commonly undertaken by the best, most ethical defense
lawyers. Take, for example, the client who brings some business records
to counsel to review to determine if he properly filed last year's income
tax return. If counsel determines that the records show the client grossly
underpaid his taxes, can she lawfully retain that evidence in the client's
file or return that evidence to the client? Does such documentary
evidence ever have to be disclosed to law enforcement authorities sua
sponte?"
Or consider a lawyer whose client wants to know if a tape that he
found in his son's closet is child pornography. Does the mere fact that
counsel views the tape and deems it pornographic mean that his
temporary possession of it is criminal? May counsel destroy the tape or
return it to her client, or must she turn the tape over to law enforcement
authorities? 6 ' As Standard 4-4.6 recognizes, counsel must be provided
the latitude to review documents, tapes, and any other physical evidence
so that clients can consult freely with counsel and secure proper legal

259. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
260. Neither Model Rule 3.4(a) nor state statutes on obstruction of justice or tampering draw a
distinction between physical evidence and documentary evidence. Indeed, documents in the
possession of a lawyer are only protected by the attorney-client privilege to the extent that the
documents would be shielded by the Fifth Amendment if still in the hands of the client. See Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976). For a persuasive discussion of the claim that there is no
principled reason to distinguish a lawyer's duties with respect to a smoking gun document from those
regarding a smoking gun, see Reitz, supra note 68, at 634-36. Many cases support Reitz's claim. See,
e.g., Clutchette v. Rushen, 770 F.2d 1469, 1472-73 ( 9 th Cir. 1985); Morrell v. State, 575 P.2d 1200,
1207-Il (Alaska i99o); State v. Guthrie, 631 N.W.2d 190, 194 (S.D. 2oo). Nonetheless, no reported
decision has extended the obligation to turn over physical evidence to include ordinary business
documents, even though theoretically, it should apply. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 31, at 39-41.

261. For a controversial case in which defense counsel pleaded guilty for destroying a computer
that contained pornographic images, see United States v. Russell, 639 F. Supp. 2d 226 (D. Conn. 2007);
Alison Leigh Cowan, Lawyer Admits Destroying Evidence of Pornography,N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 28, 2007,
at B5.
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representation. Clients must be able to show documents or evidence to
counsel without fear that counsel's examination and temporary
possession will automatically result in counsel turning that evidence over
to law enforcement authorities. Moreover, counsel must be free to
temporarily possess such evidence without fear that she will be criminally
prosecuted or disciplined for doing nothing more than attempting to
render appropriate legal assistance. Although the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards cannot guarantee defense lawyers an absolute safe harbor,
Standard 4-4.6 needs to be a powerful voice urging prosecutors,
disciplinary authorities, and courts not to unduly restrict the ability of
criminal defense lawyers to provide their clients effective representation.
There will, of course, be times when defense counsel comes into
possession of an incriminating piece of physical evidence through no
fault of her own. An inexperienced law clerk may receive an item from
the defendant or a family member, a bag may be left at the lawyer's
office, or counsel may receive a piece of incriminating evidence in the
mail. The defense lawyer now has possession of an incriminating item
that she does not want to retain because it cannot in any way aid the
defense. Unless required to do so by the law in counsel's jurisdiction or
by a court order, defense counsel is directed by Standard 4-4.6(b) to
return the item to the source "except as provided in paragraphs (c) and
(d)."

The commentary to 4-4.6 offers useful guidance for those situations
in which defense counsel cannot "promptly" return the item to the
source.263 It properly insists that items be retained at counsel's office in a
manner that does not impede the lawful ability of the authorities to
obtain the item.264 The commentary does not, however, direct defense
counsel as to what she should do after she has retained the evidence "for
a limited period of time" and cannot return the item to the source.265 If,
for example, defense counsel does not feel she can return a murder
weapon to the source-her client's mother-because the mother
unequivocally said she would throw it in a nearby lake, then how long
can defense counsel retain possession of the item? What does counsel do
with the item after the limited period expires? Neither Standard 4-4.6 nor
the commentary answers these questions.
Standard 4-4.6's failure to limit how long defense counsel can retain
contraband is puzzling. The commentary to 4-4.6 rightfully warns that
defense counsel might be "loathe" to return contraband to the source.26
Absent a pending case or contrary legal authority in counsel's
262. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-4.6(b) (3d ed. 1993).

263. Id. § 4-4.6 cmt. at 195.
264. Id.
265. See id.

266. Id. § 4-4.6 cmt. at 196.
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jurisdiction, the commentary urges counsel to destroy the contraband.
The commentary indicates that contraband that cannot be lawfully
destroyed or an item whose return to the source poses an unreasonable
risk of physical harm must be disclosed to law enforcement authorities or
delivered to them.'6 The commentary implies, therefore, that other items
that cannot be returned to the source but need not be turned over to the
authorities may be held indefinitely. That is problematic. Standard 4-4.6
ought not permit defense lawyers to hold onto items permanently,
especially contraband, but rather should be revised to require that such
items be delivered to the authorities in the same manner as evidence that
poses an unreasonable risk of physical harm if returned to the source.
Standard 4-4.6(c) directs defense counsel to disclose or deliver items in a
way "best designed to protect the client's interests. "' Generally, the
delivery should be made anonymously."o That provides law enforcement
an opportunity to use the evidence should they be able to connect it to
the defendant and avoid counsel's law office from being a repository for
an incriminating item. Ideally, more jurisdictions would follow the lead
of the District of Columbia Bar Association, which has been accepting
incriminating items from lawyers for delivery to the police since 1983.'
Finally, the commentary to Standard 4-4.6 should expressly provide
that if defense counsel wants to conduct a test on an item like the bloody
smear on the damaged car in the scenario above,' she ought not be able
to use up the entire sample, leaving nothing or an insufficient sample for
the authorities to test. If there is a sufficient sample, counsel tests a
portion of it, and the results are potentially incriminating, then counsel
must promptly return the item to. the source. Counsel should not be
obligated to disclose the results to the authorities unless the testing or
delay has now eliminated the possibility of prosecutorial testing should
the item be discovered by the authorities. If defense counsel's decision to
test has, in fact, eliminated that possibility, then counsel should be
required to disclose the results to the authorities. Given the adverse
impact on the defendant by such a disclosure, counsel should involve the
defendant in the decision whether to test the item.7

267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. § 4-4.6(c).
270. The commentary specifically invites counsel to make disclosures "anonymously or through
the offices of a third party, e.g., through the bar association or bar disciplinary counsel." Id.; see also
Oregon Ethics Op. 2005-105 (2005) (noting that defense counsel who takes a murder weapon from a
client must turn it over to the police, but advising this should be done anonymously or through an
intermediary to avoid implicating the client).
271. See Hansen,supra note 28, at 30.
272. See discussion supra Parts I.C. & III.D.
273. Because of the significance of such a decision, the client ought to have the final say in this
decision. A full discussion of that issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
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CONCLUSION

Standard 4-4.6 provides lawyers and the courts with a reasonably
clear path through a very thorny thicket. For those who share Justice
White's vision of the role of the criminal defense lawyer,"74 Standard 4-4.6
rightfully allows defense counsel to seek to minimize harm to her client,
if she takes possession of any piece of incriminating evidence, by
permitting counsel to return the evidence to the source instead of turning
it over to the authorities. It is not surprising that most defense lawyers
would prefer this approach, because they are not forced to betray their
clients or to take action that is so contrary to their clients' best
interests. 7 ' Taking disloyal action is particularly hard when counsel
gained her client's trust through an unequivocal pledge of confidentiality.
For those who envision a different, less partisan role for defense
counsel,"76 Standard 4-4.6 may draw fire for undervaluing the criminal
defense lawyer's responsibilities as an officer of the court to promote
truth. A mandatory disclosure rule best ensures that defense lawyers do
not interfere with law enforcement authorities' access to evidence and
that their law offices do not become hiding places for evidentiary items.
The return-to-the-source rule provides more opportunities for tactical
maneuvering by defense counsel and their clients and inevitably means
that the authorities will have a more difficult time, in some cases, in
securing the conviction of the guilty.
In the end, one's view of the merits of Standard 4-4.6 is likely to
turn-as is so often the case-on where one sits. For the conscientious
defense lawyer, anxious to provide a zealous defense and advance the
interests of her client without betraying her confidences, Standard 4-4.6
offers viable options. For prosecutors, Restatement section I i9 may be a
more attractive approach, because it seemingly ensures that more
incriminating evidence will find its way into their possession, thereby
enabling them to secure more convictions. Yet, if all criminal defense
lawyers knew that taking possession of an item of physical evidence
always obligated them to deliver the item to the authorities, then rarely,
if ever, would defense counsel take possession of incriminating physical
evidence. The evidence would be left where it was located, and it might
or might not be discovered by the police. Or the lawyer would refuse to
take possession of an item in the first place, frequently resulting in the
evidence being discarded or destroyed. The authorities would only
274. See supra note io9 and accompanying text.
275. In my experience as a public defender and clinical teacher, variations of the physical evidence
dilemma surface quite regularly. The fact that, since the adoption of Standard 4-4.6, there have been
relatively few reported decisions involving lawyers' retention of physical evidence may reflect the fact
that criminal defense lawyers generally utilize the return-to-the-source option.
276. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1031, 1033 (1975); Subin, supra note 99, at 1I81.
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receive evidence from lawyers who did not understand their
responsibilities and unwittingly took possession of incriminating
evidence, or did so under the mistaken belief that the evidence might be
exculpatory."'
Thus, it is not clear that the authorities would actually gain much
evidence under a mandatory disclosure regime. On the other hand, the
cost to those clients who reveal the location of incriminating evidence to
counsel and then learn that their lawyers foolishly took possession of the
evidence only to hand the evidence promptly over to the authorities is
enormous. Such betrayals would further discourage clients from trusting
their lawyers, which in turn will weaken the ability of defense lawyers to
effectively represent their clients. Equally important, a mandatory
disclosure regime discourages criminal defense lawyers from ever taking
possession of physical evidence where the significance of the evidence is
uncertain or questionable, for fear that it may be incriminating and
warrant disclosure to the authorities. This may well lead to the wrongful
prosecution or conviction of more innocent defendants, whose lawyers
fail to take possession of or to discover evidence that ultimately would
have been exculpatory. For those who, like Justice White, believe in the
adversary system, such costs certainly outweigh the modest gains of a
mandatory disclosure regime.

277. See I HAZARD & HODES, supra note 31, § 9.29, at 9-124 (acknowledging that once clients are
properly warned, they will insist on being allowed to leave with the evidence).
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A
Physical Evidence

APPENDIx

Standard 4-4.6:

(a) Defense counsel who receives a physical item under
circumstances implicating a client in criminal conduct should disclose the
location of or should deliver that item to law enforcement authorities
only: (i) if required by law or court order, or (2) as provided in
paragraph (d).
(b) Unless required to disclose, defense counsel should return the
item to the source from whom defense counsel received it, except as
provided in paragraphs (c) and (d). In returning the item to the source,
defense counsel should advise the source of the legal consequences
pertaining to possession or destruction of the item. Defense counsel
should also prepare a written record of these events for his or her file,
but should not give the source a copy of such record.
(c) Defense counsel may receive the item for a reasonable period of
time during which defense counsel: (i) intends to return it to the owner;
(2) reasonably fears that return of the item to the source will result in
destruction of the item; (3) reasonably fears that return of the item to the
source will result in physical harm to anyone; (4) intends to test,
examine, inspect, or use the item in any way as part of defense counsel's
representation of the client; or (5) cannot return it to the source. If
defense counsel tests or examines the item, he or she should thereafter
return it to the source unless there is reason to believe that the evidence
might be altered or destroyed or used to harm another or return is
otherwise impossible. If defense counsel retains the item, he or she
should retain it in his or her law office in a manner that does not impede
the lawful ability of law enforcement authorities to obtain the item.
(d) If the item received is contraband, i.e., an item possession of
which is in and of itself a crime such as narcotics, defense counsel may
suggest that the client destroy it where there is no pending case or
investigation relating to this evidence and where such destruction is
clearly not in violation of any criminal statute. If such destruction is not
permitted by law or if in defense counsel's judgment he or she cannot
retain the item, whether or not it is contraband, in a way that does not
pose an unreasonable risk of physical harm to anyone, defense counsel
should disclose the location of or should deliver the item to law
enforcement authorities.
(e) If defense counsel discloses the location of or delivers the item
to law enforcement authorities under paragraphs (a) or (d), or to a third
party under paragraph (c)(I), he or she should do so in the way best
designed to protect the client's interests.
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B
Handling Incriminating Physical Evidence
APPENDIX

Standard 4-4.8:

(a) Defense counsel should not tamper with, conceal, or destroy
physical evidence which may incriminate the client, unless authorized by
the court.
(b) Defense counsel who receives a physical item implicating a
client in criminal conduct should disclose the location of or should
deliver that item to law enforcement authorities only: (i) if required by
law or court order, or (2) as provided in paragraph (e).
(c) Unless required to disclose, defense counsel should return the
item to the source from whom, or place from which, defense counsel
received it, except as provided below. In returning the item, defense
counsel should advise the source of the possible legal consequences
pertaining to possession or destruction of the item. Defense counsel
should prepare a written record of these events and should maintain that
record in the work-product file, but should not give the source a copy of
such record.
(d) Defense counsel may receive such a physical item for a
reasonable period of time during which defense counsel: (i) intends to
return it to the owner; (2) reasonably fears that return of the item will
result in its destruction; (3) reasonably fears that return of the item will
result in physical harm to anyone; (4) intends to test, examine, inspect, or
use the item in any way as part of defense counsel's representation of the
client; or (5) is unable to return the item. Counsel should take steps to
ensure that any testing does not alter the item or interfere with its later
testing by the government. If defense counsel tests or examines the item,
counsel should thereafter return it unless there is reason to believe that
the evidence might be altered or destroyed or used to harm another or
return is otherwise impossible. If defense counsel does not return the
item, the lawyer should not keep the item in a location with other clients'
privileged materials, which could be exposed to governmental
examination if a search is conducted. Rather, counsel should either retain
the item in a clearly separate and independent manner, or deliver it to a
third-party lawyer who will be obligated to maintain the confidences of
the client and defense counsel. Defense counsel should not knowingly
impede lawful efforts of law enforcement authorities to obtain the item.
(e) If the item received is contraband (that is, an item possession of
which is in and of itself unlawful, such as narcotics), defense counsel may
suggest that the client destroy it if there is no pending case or
investigation relating to the evidence and if such destruction is clearly
not in violation of any criminal statute nor obstructing any lawful law
enforcement process. If such destruction is not permitted by law and
defense counsel determines that the item cannot be retained, whether or
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not it is contraband, in a way that does not pose an unreasonable risk of
physical harm to anyone, defense counsel should disclose the location of
or should deliver the item to law enforcement authorities.
(f) If defense counsel discloses the location of or delivers the item to
law enforcement authorities, counsel should do so in a manner that
protects the client's interests.
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